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ABSTRACT
The first essay asks the question: Do investors pay attention to foreign market conditions when they
evaluate multinational corporations? Using geographic segment disclosures by U.S. multinational
companies, I find that stock prices do not promptly incorporate information regarding changes in
foreign market conditions, which in turn generates return predictability in the cross-section of firms
with foreign operations. A simple trading strategy that exploits geographic information yields risk
adjusted return of 135 basis points per month, or 16.2% per year. The predictability cannot be
explained by firm’s own momentum, industry momentum, post-earnings-announcement drift, being
a conglomerate, or exposure to emerging market risk. Consistent with the investor inattention hy-
pothesis, I further document that firms with less analysts, firms with lower institutional holdings,
small and medium-sized firms, and firms with more complex foreign sales compositions, exhibit
stronger return predictability. This paper is the first to document the predictable link between
foreign country-level index returns and U.S. firm-level stock returns, and adds to the growing lit-
erature concerning the role of investor inattention and firm complexity in price formation.
The second essay finds that in contrast to the perception of a common 2/20 fee structure, there
are considerable cross-sectional and time series variations in hedge fund fees using a large panel data
set. Fund family characteristics and prior performance play an important role in fee determination.
New fund families are likely to charge at- or above-median fees. Initial fees of funds introduced
by an existing family are positively related to the prior performance of the family as well as of
the investment strategy they follow. Furthermore, management fees are dynamically adjusted
in response to past fund performance. Funds that increase management fee more aggressively
experience a bigger drop in subsequent money inflows, and are more likely to maintain their good
performance. This suggests that fee increases, which typically apply only to new investors, may
benefit existing investors by mitigating diseconomies of scale.
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The third essay measures the causal impact of public sector’s spending on private sector’s in-
vestment. Based on the fact that federal funds allocated to the local governments are largely
dependent on the local population level, we use population count revisions in decennial census
years as exogenous shocks to the cross-sectional allocation of federal funds. We document strong
evidence that exogenous increases in the federal spending reduce both firms’ capital and R&D
investment. This contraction in investment is accompanied by a decrease in employment growth, a
decrease in sales growth, as well as an increase in dividend payouts and repurchases. The effect of
government spending is more pronounced among firms that are smaller-sized, more geographically
concentrated, and located in regions with higher employment rate. Furthermore, we find direct
evidence that an exogenous increase in government hiring and wage spending reduces subsequent
corporate employment growth. Taken all together, the evidence we present is consistent with the
crowding out effect of government spending, not through the traditional interest rate or tax rate
channel, but through the labor channel.
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CHAPTER 1
INVESTOR’S INATTENTION TO GEOGRAPHIC SEGMENTS
1.1 Introduction
Many U.S. multinational companies generate increasing revenues from foreign markets. For exam-
ples, in 2010, Walmart has 24.6% of total sales from abroad, Intel has 9.6% of its sales from Japan,
Avon has 41% of sales from Latin America, and 8.6% of Sealy Corporation total sales comes from
Europe. It is therefore natural to expect that shocks to foreign market demand should affect firms
with foreign operations. In particular, the profitability and stock value of U.S. firms with foreign
sales and operations should respond instantaneously to unexpected changes in foreign market con-
ditions. However, do investors pay attention to this unambiguous link between multinational firms
and their foreign markets?
In this chapter, I investigate this relationship. I analyze the impact of changes in foreign market
conditions, measured by changes in foreign stock market indices, on the performance of U.S. firms
having operations in those markets, and study how shocks to foreign environment are incorporated
in stock returns.
As a motivating example, consider the case of Las Vegas Sands Corporation (NYSE:LVS) and its
recent expansion into the Asian market. Las Vegas Sands is a casino resort company that owns the
iconic Venetian Resort-Hotel-Casino in Las Vegas. In August 2007, Las Vegas Sands launched The
Venetian Macao in Macao, a similar casino resort modeled on its sister resort in Las Vegas. The
Venetian Macao was a large investment and a major expansion of Las Vegas Sands into the Asian
market. The new structure costs $2.4 billion dollar to build and is the largest single structure hotel
building in Asia and the fifth-largest building in the world by area.
One would naturally anticipate that subsequent to opening of The Venetian Macao, Las Vegas
Sands sales and revenue would be greatly influenced by the Asian market environment. In addition,
one would expect that news regarding performance of the Asian market should instantaneously be
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incorporated into Las Vegas Sands stock market valuation in the U.S.. We should therefore see no
predictability between Asia stock market index return and future Las Vegas Sands stock return.
Nevertheless, this is not the case.
Figure 1 shows the scatter plots of monthly LVS stock returns with respect to the lagged monthly
Asia index returns, both before and after launching the Macao casino resort. I superimposes a least-
squares lines on each scatter plot. The slope is close to zero before and increases significantly after
August 2007. Before Las Vegas Sands opens The Venetian Macao, the correlation between LVS
stock returns and the lagged Asia index returns is 0.049, and not significantly different from zero.
After August 2007, the correlation increases to 0.454 and is significantly different from zero at 1%
confidence level. In other words, since the opening of the Venetian Macao, the lagged Asia stock
returns can strongly predicts Las Vegas Sands subsequent stock return in the U.S., even though
Las Vegas Sands exposure to Asia is publicly available for quite some time.
This predictability extends beyond this particular example. In more general tests, I find that
there is significant predictability in return of stocks with foreign operations. A portfolio strategy
that buys firms whose geographic segments were located in countries that had the highest returns in
the previous month and selling firms whose geographic segments were located in countries that had
the lowest returns yield risk adjusted abnormal returns of 135 basis points over the next month (or
an annualized return of 16.2%). In other words, the broad stock market performance of the areas
where a firm does business (as measured by the fraction of total sales in that particular region)
predicts the firm’s future stock market return. I refer to this return predictability as “geographic
momentum”. Returns to this geographic momentum strategy yield strong results for the first
month after portfolio formation, with zero predictability thereafter. More importantly, returns to
the geographic momentum strategy have no exposure to standard traded risk factors. The result
is not driven by firm’s own momentum, industry momentum, post-earnings-announcement drift,
being a conglomerate, or exposure to emerging market risk.
I further present evidence consistent with investors having limited attention. If limited attention
is driving the geographic momentum story, it should be the case that varying the degree of investor
inattention would vary the magnitude and significance of the result. Reconcilable with the investor
inattention hypothesis, I document that the return predictability is strongest among firms that
generally receive less investor attention: less analyst coverage, small and medium-sized stocks, and
stock that are not in major stock indices. Furthermore, the predictability is also strongest among
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firms that are geographically more complex, i.e., firms with sales coming from more countries.
There are a number of alternative explanations for the geographic momentum effect. First of all,
the results may not be driven by an inattention story, but rather by risk factors. One might argue
that firms that have sales and operations in emerging markets, such as China, Brazil, India or
Russia, are more exposed to emerging market risk and hence should logically enjoy higher expected
returns. Sorting firms based on their past geographic returns may just be grouping firms based on
the degree of exposure to emerging markets risks. However, I provide evidence to show that this is
not the case. I find that the geographic momentum effect is essentially unchanged after controlling
for the percent of a firm’s sales that come from a particular country.
Cohen and Lou (2012) document that conglomerates exhibit substantial stock return predictabil-
ity from the weighted-average returns of an equivalent group of stand-alone firms that have business
operations similar to the conglomerate. Another valid concern is that my geographic momentum
effect is simply a noisy proxy for their “complicated firm” effect. A conglomerate may have a
chocolate business segment in Switzerland, and at the same time, have a coffee business segment in
Italy. Hence, stock indices in both countries are just proxies for the conditions of different business
segments. I provide evidence that geographic momentum is not the same as the “complicated
firms” effect. Indeed, the “’geographic momentum’ and the “complicated firm” effects seem to be
totally orthogonal to each other as the return to each strategy is unchanged after controlling for
the other return strategy.
This chapter contributes to the literature on the role of investor limited inattention in asset
pricing by being the first to document the predictable link between country level indices returns
and firm level stock returns, and contributes to the growing literature on the role of investor
inattention and firm complexity in price formation.
Merton (1987), Hong and Stein (1999), and Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) provide theoretical foun-
dations for asset pricing in an economy where investors have limited cognitive resources. Their
models’ implication is that slow information processing can generate expected returns not fully
explained by traditional asset pricing models. Empirically, Huberman and Regev (2001) provides
evidence that investors pay more attention to news that are more easily available and more appeal-
ing to them. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) shows that investors respond slower to Friday earning
announcements.
My findings relate to the literature on information diffusion and lead-lag effects in stock returns.
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Lo and MacKinlay (1990) show that large stocks lead small stocks. Hong, Torous, and Valkanov
(2007) find that industries lead stock markets.
This chapter is also related to, but is distinctive from, recent papers by Cohen and Frazzini
(2008), Cohen and Lou (2012), Shahrur, Becker, and Rosenfeld (2010), Menzly and Ozbas (2010),
and Shahrur, Becker, and Rosenfeld (2010). They find similar supply chain momentum at the firm
and industry level and present evidence that the return predictability is consistent with gradual
information diffusion. In particular, Cohen and Frazzini (2008) find that stock returns of the
largest customer can predict stock return of the supplier firm. Menzly and Ozbas (2010) show
there is strong predictability between upstream and downstream industries. Shahrur, Becker, and
Rosenfeld (2010) provide evidence that stock returns of customer industries predict stock returns
of supplier industries using an international sample.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, I characterize the data of
geographic segments and my test strategies. In Section 3, I present evidences on the geographic
momentum effect. Section 4 presents suggestive evidence that geographic momentum is driven
by investor inattention. Section 5 provides robustness checks and evidence to reject alternative
hypothesis. The last section concludes.
1.2 Data
The analysis of stock market reactions to changes in foreign market conditions requires information
on firms’ foreign operation and sales to be publicly available at the time changes in foreign markets
conditions are measured. In June 1997, the FASB issued SFAS No.131, which became effective
for the fiscal year beginning after December 15, 1997 (FASB 1997) and requires firms to report
disaggregated information about their operating segments that comprise more than 10% of a firm’s
total consolidated annual sales. An operating segment may be based on product and services,
geographic location, legal entity, customer type, or other basis. Firms are also required to report
sales from geographic segments. Geographic segments information is therefore publicly available
through 10-Ks.
I obtain data on firm’s segment accounting and financial information from Compustat Segments
files. The time frame of geographic segment data release is the same as other standard financial
variables. Hence, it can be reasonably assumed that data on firm-country links studied here are
publicly available at the same time as other standard financial variables are released.
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In constructing my sample, I exclude firms that report segment sales less than 1% and more
than 110% of the total sales reported in Compustat annual files. The first condition is to exclude
from my sample firms that operate in multiple geographic segments, but does not report or report
incorrectly their geographic sales. The latter condition is to exclude firms that have sum of all
geographic segments not adding up to firm’s total sales.
I measure market conditions in different geographic segments using return data on a large sample
of countries and regions. I collect index return data from Morgan Stanley Capital International
(MSCI) Global Equity Index. My sample consists of 13 regional indices and 34 country indices.
The countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, and USA. The regional indices are All Countries Americas, All Countries Asia, All
Countries Asia Pacific, Asia Pacific excluding Japan, Arabian markets, Arabian Markets & Africa,
Emerging and Frontier Market Africa, Emerging and Frontier Europe & Middle East, Emerging
Market Latin America, EU Union, Europe, Europe excluding UK, World excluding USA, North
America, and The Pacific. Indices are value-weighted and include the largest and most liquid stocks
in each market. All indices are denominated in U.S. dollars. In order to ensure the results are not
driven by movements in foreign exchange rates, the entire analysis of this chapter is redone using
indices denominated in local currency as well. The results remain unchanged using this alternative
index definition.
I merge indices return data to the geographic segment files by phonic match geographic names
reported by firms to standard index names used by MSCI. I double check by hand to make sure
geographic names are correctly matched to stock market indices.
I compute what I define as a firm’s “geographic return”, which I refer to as GeoRet, as the
weighted average of its geographic indices returns. Weight given to each country’s index return is
a fraction of previous year’s sales that come from that country divided by total sales. For firms
that report only a single sales number for multiple geographical regions, I use the equally-weighted
average of it’s geographic returns.
In accord with the previous literature, I also exclude financial firms in my analysis (SIC codes
between 6001 and 6999). However, this restriction is not pivotal in any of my results. I will
re-incorporate financial firms later in one of the robustness tests and show that the study is not
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sensitive to this restriction.
I merge the Compustat sample with CRSP monthly stock return files, requiring firms to have
non-missing market equity and book equity at the fiscal year end. Similar to Fama-French (1993), in
order for segment and financial information to be publicly known before any returns predictability
are measured, I impose at least a six months gap between firm’s fiscal year ends and stock returns.
More specifically, returns from July in year y to June in y+1 are matched with the latest Compustat
and Segments data in the fiscal year that ends before or on December in year y − 1. 1
In addition to stock returns, I also obtain data on analyst earnings forecast. In particular,
I extract from IBES Detail files of all available analyst forecast for subsequent annual earnings
reports. I use the number of analysts covering a firm to proxy for the degree of inattention.
My final data has 357,523 firm-month observations spanning from 1998 to 2010. Table 3.1 panel
A reports the summary statistics of the main variables of interest. Panel B provide the correlations
of GeoRet lagged by one month with variables known to predict stock returns. The correlations
are computed using monthly observations of all stocks. GeoRett−1 does not seem to be correlated
with any other variables.
1.3 Results
In this section, I present results on the geographic momentum effect. I first perform portfolio tests
that sort stocks into portfolios based on their lagged geographic returns. I then provide more formal
tests using Fama-Macbeth regression method.
1.3.1 Portfolio Tests
To examine the link between geographic return and future stock returns, I sort stocks into various
portfolio based on their previous month’s geographic returns. At the beginning of each calendar
month t, I rank stocks in ascending order based on geographic returns in month t−1. For each firm,
geographic returns are weighted average of geographic return indices, where weights are fractions
of geographic sales over total sales. A firm’s geographic segments and the corresponding sales
information are obtained from the fiscal year ending at least 6 months before portfolios are formed.
1I also skip the first 3 day of each month in computing monthly stock returns to control for non-synchronous
trading restrictions, or potential end-of-month macroeconomics information released in foreign countries. The results
do not change.
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I then assign stocks to 5 quintile portfolios and compute the value and equally-weighted returns
within a given quintile portfolio. The quintile cutoff points are determined based on unique geo-
graphic returns in the previous month. The 5 portfolios are balanced every month and the time
series of those 5 portfolios track calendar time performance. I then compute the abnormal returns
by running time series regression of portfolio excess returns on traded factors in calendar time.
Figure 1.3 plots the time series of the monthly excess returns from the equally-weighted geographic
momentum portfolio strategy that buy the top geographic return stocks and short sell the lowest
geographic return stocks.
Table 1.2 shows the main results of this chapter. This table reports excess return and alphas
in month t of the geographic momentum portfolios formed in month t − 1 from July 1998 to
December 2010. Panel A presents the average raw excess returns of equally-weighted geographic
momentum portfolio, as well as alphas of the portfolios with respect to the CAPM, the Fama-
French 3 factor model, the Carhart 4 factor model and finally the 5 factor model that includes
Pastor and Stambaugh liquidity factor. Panel B reports the same analysis with value-weighted
returns. All numbers are in percentage points.
Sorting firms on lagged geographic returns yields large differences in subsequent monthly returns.
The average monthly excess return of the quintile portfolio sorted by geographic returns increases
monotonically, from -0.29% in the lowest quintile to 1.23% in the highest quintile. Column 6 (H-L)
shows the excess returns of a zero cost portfolio that buys (go long) the top 20% highest geographic
return and sells short the bottom 20% lowest geographic return. The difference in excess return
between the highest quintile and lowest quintile portfolio is 1.52% per month, or approximately
18.24% per year, with a t-statistic of 3.23.
The precision and robustness of the geographic momentum strategy is displayed in Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.4 shows returns from this strategy for every month from June 1999 to January 2010. The
geographic momentum strategy yields positive returns for 65% of the months and returns un excess
of 5% for 22% of the months, while yielding negative returns for 35% of the months and return
worst than -5% for only 7% of the months.
Further, adjusting returns for sensitivity with multiple risk factors has little effect on the results.
After controlling for standard factors, the bottom quintile portfolio has negative and significant
alpha, while the top quintile portfolio have positive and significant alpha. The equally-weighted
portfolio that long stocks in the top geographic return quintile and short stocks in the bottom
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geographic return quintile has a monthly alpha of 1.52%, 1.40%, 1.40% and 1.43% with respect
to the CAPM, the Fama-French 3 factors model, the Carhart 4 factor model and including the
Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor, respectively. All alphas are statistically significant. Using
value-weighted scheme rather an equal-weighted delivers similar results. Therefore, the smallest
and least liquid stocks in the sample do not appear to be solely driving the results.
Table 1.3 reports estimated loadings of the zero cost long short geographic momentum portfolio on
Fama-French, Carhart momentum and Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factors. None of the standard
factors can explain the geographic momentum returns, either individually or jointly. This indicates
that the geographic momentum strategy is very robust and not sensitive to the state of the economy
and performance of other popular investment strategies.
I next test whether the geographic momentum strategy is due to investor overreaction or to slow
diffusion of information. I examine the strategy’s return over a broader future horizon. Table 1.4
follows the average returns and alphas of the geographic momentum portfolios for every month from
1 month to 6 months after portfolio formation. All portfolios are formed at time t = 0 and ri,i+1
are returns over month [i, i+ 1]. Portfolios are equally-weighted in Panel A and value-weighted in
Panel B.
In both weighting schemes, the geographic long-short portfolio delivers positive and significant
excess return and alphas only in the immediate month after portfolio formation and is not significant
the in following months. This suggest that the returns is not driven by overreaction to news about
firm’s geographic condition, but rather by a slow diffusion of information. Thus, information from
the geographic markets of various segments is incorporated into firm prices with a one month lag,
but appears to be fully incorporated into stock prices after one month.
1.3.2 Regression Tests
The portfolio results present a strong link between past geographic returns and current stock
returns. In this section, I formally test the geographic momentum effect using Fama-MacBeth
regressions. As in Fama and MacBeth (1973), I estimate the cross-sectional relation between
lagged geographic returns and current stock returns for each month, then take the average of the
coefficient estimates across the entire sample period. A regression framework also allows me to
control for a number of variables known to forecast the cross-section of returns, such as stock’s own
momentum, industry momentum, and post-earnings-announcement drift.
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The dependent variable is this month’s stock return. The main independent variable of interest is
previous month’s geographic index return. Control variables include log book-to-market (log(BM))
and size (Size). log(BM) for stock returns from July of year t to June of year t + 1 is computed
using book equity at the end of the previous fiscal year before and closest to December of year
t − 1, and market equity in December of year t − 1. Size is log market equity at the end of June
of year t.
I also include firm’s own one-month-lagged stock return (Rett−1) and twelve-month-lagged cu-
mulative stock return (Rett−12,t−2) to control for Jegadeesh (1990) reversal effect and Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993) momentum effect. To control for industry momentum effect by Moskowitx
(1999), I also include lagged industry returns (PrimaryIndRett−1 and PrimaryIndRett−12,t−2).
My result could be driven by post-earnings-announcement drift. It could be the case that firms
releases important information regarding their foreign earnings and profitability in quarterly finan-
cial reports. In essence, the geographic momentum predictability may not be due to inattention to
geographic returns, but rather due to the well known under-reaction to earnings announcement. In
order to reject this alternative explanation, I include the standardized unexpected earnings (SUE)
as a control variable.
I computed SUE using the Kim and Kim (2003) methodology. The SUE of firm i in quarter q
is computed as:
SUEi,q =
EPSi,q − E(EPSi,q)
σ(EPSi,q − E(EPSi,q))
where EPSi,q is quarterly actual earning per share of firm i in quarter q, and E(EPSi,q) is the
estimated quarterly earning per share of firm i in quarter q. σ(·) is the standard deviation of the
forecast errors. To obtain E(EPSi,q), I assume the following AR(1) process by using the most
recent 24 quarters’ observations, similar to Kim and Kim (2003):
EPSi,q − EPSi,q−4 = φi,0 + φi,1EPSi,q−1 − EPSi,q−5 + i,q
E(EPSi,q) = EPSi,q−4 + φˆi,0 + φˆi,1(EPSi,q−1 − EPSi,q−5)
Table 1.9 presents the Fama-Macbeth regression results. In Column 1 to Column 5, I regress
monthly stock returns on each variable of interest, followed by the inclusion all previously defined
variables. All regression specifications deliver the same results: lagged geographic returns strongly
9
predict subsequent stock returns. The results are large and robust. The magnitude of the effect is
similar to that of the portfolio test. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in GeoRet is
associated with a 1 percentage point higher monthly return for the firm (using the coefficient on
GeoRett−1 of 0.22 from column 5 of Table 1.9 and the standard deviation of 4.7%)
1.4 Investor Inattention
1.4.1 Test for Inattention
All tests presented in the previous section point to the same conclusion: there is a strong geographic
momentum effect and none of the standard known risk factors can explain this result. Henceforth, I
provide suggestive evidence that my geographic momentum effect is driven by investor inattention.
If in fact limited attention is driving the return predictability of the geographic momentum strat-
egy, varying the degree of inattention should translate to changes in the magnitude and significance
of the effect. I test the hypothesis that return predictability is more severe for firms that can be
generally identify as attracting less investor attention: firms with less analyst coverage, firms with
less institutional holdings, small and medium firms, and firms that is not part of the S&P 500
index.
Table 1.7 presents the mean excess returns and alphas with respect to various risk factors of
the zero-cost portfolios that hold the top lagged geographic returns and sell short the bottom
lagged geographic returns. The sample is divided further into smaller subsamples based on various
proxies of investor inattention. In particular, I divide the sample into two subsamples based on
Size, Analyst Coverage, and Institutional holdings, where Low and High are bottom 50 percentile
and top 50 percentile of each respective category.
The results suggest that all of the predictability comes from firms that usually attract less
attention from investors. In particular, firms that have lower analyst coverage, firms that are small
and medium in size, firms with low institutional holdings and firms not a major stock index exhibit
the strongest return predictability.
Another way to vary the degree of inattention is to vary the degree of difficulty for investor
to process the information. Given that investors have limited cognitive resources to take into
account multiple sources of information, increasing the complexity in firms’ geographic operation
can increase the predictability of the results. In other words, the more diversified the foreign sales
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of a firm, the more difficult it is to correctly value the firm.
I measure the geographic complexity of a firm using the Herfindahl index.
H =
N∑(geographic sales
total sales
)2
where N is the number of geographic segments the company operated in. A low number means
that firm’s sales are widely distributed among more markets, while a high Herfindahl index means
that firm’s sales are more concentrated in a few markets.
Table tab:inattention separates the sample into 2 subgroups based on their geographic sales
Herfindahl index. All of the predictability comes from the subgroup of firms that have their sales
distributed more evenly among multiple geographic segments.
1.4.2 Inattention versus Market Friction
Using various proxies for the degree of inattention, I show that all of the geographic momentum
predictability comes from firms that generally attract less investors’ attention. However, one might
argue that my finding is not entirely an inattention story. This is particularly true when dividing
firms using the Herfindahl index, where most of the abnormal returns come from geographically
complex firms.
In this subsection, I attempt to differentiate between two alternative explanations for the geo-
graphic momentum predictability. First, investors are not aware of the link between multinational
companies and their geographic regions. Alternatively, investors are aware of the publicly available
link, but do not have the necessary resources to process those with more complicated information.
In order to test those two hypotheses, I independently double sort firms into four subgroups, low
versus high complexity, measured by the Herfindahl index of sales composition; and low versus
high inattention, proxied by Size, Analyst Coverage, Institutional Holdings and whether or not the
stock belongs to the S&P 500 Index. I then compute the Pastor-Stambaugh 5-factor alphas of the
zero-cost portfolios that hold the top lagged geographic returns and sell short the bottom lagged
geographic returns for each subgroup.
The results for this test are given in Table 1.8. When keeping the complexity measure constant,
for both high and low complexity groups, all of the return predictability comes from firms that
usually receive less investor attention. The differences are significant and can be found in all four
proxies of inattention.
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If we keep the inattention measure constant, the difference in predictability between low and
high complexity firms can only be found for low inattention groups. However, this results is weak
and differences are not significant. For high inattention groups, the results are mixed and there is
no clear difference in predictability between low or high complex firms.
In sum, this subsection shows that the geographic momentum strategy can for the most part be
explained by investor inattention, rather by frictions to process complicated information.
1.5 Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations
By dividing the samples using different proxies for investor inattention, I show that the geographic
momentum predictability can be explained by the investor inattention hypothesis. In this section, I
provide a battery of robustness tests for my results. I then explore a number of potential alternative
explanations for this predictability and demonstrate that my result is robust to all alternative
interpretations.
1.5.1 Robustness Checks
Table 1.5 verifies the robustness of the results in various subsamples. In all subsample, similar
to Table 1.2, I sort stocks on the lagged geographic returns into quintiles. I present each quintile
portfolio’s average excess returns, the zeros cost long high short low excess returns, and alphas with
respect to various risk factors. The result for the original sample is also presented for comparison.
As a robustness test, I exclude firms have have 100% of their sales coming from the U.S. Excluding
“pure” U.S. firms address the critic that most of the abnormal returns come from comparing firms
that only operate in the U.S. and firms that have operations in foreign countries. In other words,
the observed predictability could be due to systematic differences in risk between U.S. and foreign
countries. This is clearly not the case. Table 1.3, Panel C and D report the average excess return
and alphas with respect to various risk factors of the long-short portfolio, but this time excluding
100% U.S. firms from the sample. The predictability remains strong and consistent.
A natural concern is that the geographic momentum results may also be driven by micro-
capitalization illiquid securities. Less liquid stocks react more slowly to news about geographic
segments not due to investor inattention, but rather mechanically due to infrequent trading. Some
analyses presented earlier do not support this hypothesis, as the long-short geographic momentum
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strategies based on value-weighted returns also earn large and significant risk adjusted returns. In
Panel B of Table 1.5, I present a more explicit test of the liquidity hypothesis by dropping micro-cap
stocks with price less then 5 dollars, and find very little change in the returns to the geographic
momentum strategy.
The second test (Panel C) re-incorporate financial firms (SIC codes between 6001 and 6999).
The fourth test (Panel D) excludes the 2008-2009 financial crisis period. In all subsamples test,
the results are persist and are significant.
So far, I use geographic stock market indices as a proxy for changes in foreign demand for goods
and services exported by U.S. multinational firms. One might argue that a foreign country’s GDP
growth may be a more precise measure for that country’s demand for U.S. goods.
In Table 1.6, I sort firms based on their differences in previous quarter-on-quarter GDP growth
((GDPt−1 −GDPt−5)/GDPt−5) and compute the excess value-weighted returns and risk adjusted
alphas for the long short portfolio. Similarly to the previous exercise, long short portfolio are
formed by buying stocks in the top 20 percentile and short sell stock in the bottom 20 percentile
according to their previous quarter geographic’s GDP growth.
Table 1.6 shows that differences in foreign GDP growth rate, can also predict future stock returns
for U.S. companies having sales and operation in that country.
1.5.2 Alternative Explanations
One major concern regarding the observed predictability is that the finding may not be driven by
an inattention story, but rather due to systematics differences in risk between geographic segments.
More specifically, the geographic momentum effect may be largely driven by emerging market expo-
sure. Firms that have sales and operations in emerging markets, such as China, Brazil, India or the
Russia, are more exposed to emerging market risk and hence should naturally enjoy higher returns.
Moreover, during my sample period, most emerging markets outperform developed markets, and
specifically the U.S.. Sorting firms based on past geographic returns may just simply be grouping
firms based on the degree of exposure to emerging markets.
Table 1.11 present the probability of a firm moving from one quintile portfolio in month t to
another quintile portfolio in month t + 1. The probability of staying the in same portfolio as last
period is less than 38%. Hence, turnover is high and the composition of all quintile portfolios
changes frequently.
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In a more direct test, I also rerun the Fama-Macbeth regression including a control variable for
exposure to China, which is essentially the fraction of sales that comes from China divided by
total sales. Alternatively, I also include a control variable for exposure to the four largest emerging
markets BRIC, which is again the sum of sales that comes from Brazil, Russia, India or China,
normalized by firm’s total sales. And finally, as an ultimate test, I also include in the Fama-
Macbeth regression all 47 country and region controls, each equals to sales from that geographic
region, divided by total sales. I present all tests in Table 1.9, column (4) to (6). All results indicate
that country indicators do not change the magnitude and significance of the lagged geographic
returns. Therefore, it is clear my finding is not driven by firm’s exposure to any particular country.
Another alternative explanation of my results can be found in a recent paper by Cohen and
Lou (2012). Cohen and Lou (2012) documents that stock returns of conglomerates firms can be
predicted by using a weighted average returns of a similar group of stand-alone firms that have
business operations similar to the conglomerate. One might argue that my geographic momentum
effect is simply a proxy for their “complicated firm” effect. Conglomerates may have different
business segments that perfectly coincide with different geographic segments. Hence, stock indices
returns could be just proxies for the condition of each business segments.
Similar to Cohen and Lou (2012), for each conglomerate, I compute the corresponding “pseudo-
conglomerate” return (PseudoRet). A “pseudo-conglomerate” return is the weighted average re-
turns of the conglomerate’s industry segment constructed using only stand-alone firms in the same
industry. Industry segments are similarly defined based on SIC-2 codes. For firms with no SIC-2
industry segments, I use their primary industry return.
I rerun the Fama-Macbeth regression controlling for PseudoRet. The results are presented
in Column (1) and (3) of Table 1.9. Georett−1 is still economically and statistically significant.
The magnitude of both variables are not affected by including both simultaneously in the same
regression, which indicates that my geographic momentum effect is distinct from Cohen and Lou
(2012)’s “complicated firms” effect.
To summarize, neither systematics difference in countries’ risk nor Cohen and Lou (2012)’s
complicated firms effect appear to explain the documented predictability of geographic returns.
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1.6 Real Effects
I show that stocks return of firms with foreign market sales and operations are predictable. I also
present results supporting the view that investor limited attention is the main reason behind the
geographic momentum effect. Investors are expected to incorporate all publicly available foreign
market information when evaluating stock prices of multinational firms. In this section, I exploit
the time series variation in my geographic segments data and show that firms’ real operations, i.e.
sales and operating income, are much more significantly correlated to foreign geographic return
indices when firms have sales and operation in those regions, relatively to the period when they
don’t have sales there. Effects on firms’ real operation, if found, are precisely why investors should
pay close attention to foreign market conditions.
I use a regression frame work to test the ability of past geographic returns to predict real shocks
to U.S. multinational firms today, distinguishing when firms have sales in that geographic region
and when firm’s do not. The dependent variables are firm’s sales and operating income, both scaled
by total assets, and 3 months cumulative stock returns, all computed at time t. The independent
variable is resIndexRet, which is the fitted residual from regressing a geographic index return on
the U.S. index return. The rationale behind using the fitted residual instead of using the geographic
index return itself, is to extract only the innovations in a geographic condition not attributable
to U.S. market movement. I then interact resIndexRet with geoSales/sales, the fraction of sales
coming from that geographic region over total sales. Note that the data is at quarterly frequency
and the unit of observation is now firm×quarter. The value of geoSales/sales is zero for firms
that do not have sales in a segment in a particular quarter. Independent variables are from the
previous quarter, at time t− 1. I winsorize all variables at the 1% level. I include in all regression
specifications time fixed effect and geographic fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered at firm
level.
The results in Table 1.12 suggest that when a firm does not have sales in a particular geographic
region, shocks to that region do not have any predictive power for either firm’s sales, operating
income, or stock return. The interaction term resIndexRet×geoSales/sales is significantly positive
in all specifications, indicating that only when firms have sales in a particular region at a particular
time, changes to the geographic market conditions can strongly predict the future real shocks to
the multinational firm.
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1.7 Conclusion
This chapter uses publicly available geographic segment disclosures by U.S. multinational corpo-
rations and documents a strong link between changes in foreign market conditions and expected
stock returns of U.S. multinational firms. Previous month’s geographic returns, defined as the
average of a firm’s geographic indices returns weighted by the share of firms sales in that region,
strongly predict firm’s future stock returns. Weights assigned to each country’s index is defined as
the fraction of sales coming from that country divided by firm’s total sales. A zero-cost portfolio
strategy that buys stocks with the highest geographic returns and sell short stocks with the lowest
geographic returns earns risk adjusted returns of more than 135 basis points per month, or 16.2%
per year. I call this return predictability the “geographic momentum” effect.
This result is robust across different weighting schemes and shorting dimensions. The pre-
dictability of lagged geographic returns is also found in Fama-Macbeth regression tests. This result
holds even after controlling for various firms’ characteristics and standard risk factors. In particu-
lar, firm’s geographic momentum effect can not be explained by firm’s own momentum, industry
momentum, post-earnings-announcement drift, or being a conglomerate. Most importantly, the
geographic return predictability cannot be explained by systematic differences in risk exposure to
emerging or developing markets, and developed markets. The return predictability is robust to dif-
ferent specifications, holds for multiple subsets of firms, and is strongest for the month immediate
after portfolio formation, with no predictability or reversal thereafter.
The geographic momentum effect is consistent with the story of investors having limited atten-
tion. Investors have limited time and cognition resources to process informations from multiple
foreign markets and hence delay incorporating those information into stock prices. I find evidence
that most of the return predictability is concentrated in stocks that attract less analyst forecast,
small and medium stocks, stocks that are less held by institutional investors, and stocks that do
not belong to major market indices. The return predictability is also strongest among firms that
are geographically more complex, i.e. firms with sales distributed among more countries.
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1.8 Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: Las Vegas Sands Corporation and Lagged Asia Index
Las Vegas Sands Corp. (NYSE: LVS) is a casino resort company based in Paradise, Nevada. In August
2007, the company opened the Venetian Macao Resort-Hotel, one of the the largest building in Asia by
floor area and Asia’s first Las Vegas-Style integrated Mega-Resort. The figure shows the scatter plots of
monthly LVS raw returns and the lagged Asia index returns, before and after launching the Macao Resort.
The least squares lines are added to the scatter plot. The correlation between LVS stock returns and the
lagged Asia index before launching the Macao Resort is is 0.049, and not significantly different from zero.
The correlation after open the Macao resort increases to 0.454, and is significantly different from zero at
1% confidence level.
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Figure 1.2: Event time CAR
This figure shows the cumulative abnormal return (in percentage point) in month t+ k for a zero-cost
long-short portfolio formed on geographic return in month t. At beginning of each calendar month, stocks
are sorted based on their previous month’s geographic return. The long short portfolio is then formed
based on holding the top 20% highest geographic return and sell the bottom 20% lowest geographic return.
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Figure 1.3: Returns of Geographic Momentum Strategy
This figure plots the monthly times-series return of the equally-weighted long-short portfolio that buy
stocks ranked in the top quintile and short stocks ranked in the bottom quintile of previous month’s
geographic return (i.e. GeoRett−1). GeoRett−1 is measured as the weighted average return of firm’s
geographical indices. Weights assigned to each index are the fraction of a firm’s sales in that geographical
region divided by firm’s total sales.
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Table 1.2: Abnormal Returns on Geographic Momentum Strategy.
This table reports excess returns (in %) on a portfolio of firms based on the quintile ranking of their lagged
monthly geographic returns. The first five columns report excess returns and alphas for firms sorted into
quintiles by their lagged geographic returns. The last column reports the average monthly excess return
and alphas of a portfolio that longs stocks in top quintile and shorts stocks in the bottom quintile according
to their lagged geographic returns. Besides the raw excess returns, I also report the CAPM alpha, Fama-
French 3-factor alpha, Carhart 4-factor alpha, and the Pastor-Stambaugh 5-factor alpha. The sample period
is from August 1999 to December 2009. The numbers in the parentheses are t-statistics. Standard errors are
Newey-West adjusted with 3 lags. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Equally-Weighted Returns
Panel A: Equally-Weighted Returns
1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) High−Low
Excess Return -0.29 -0.01 0.13 0.09 1.23 1.52∗∗∗
(-0.38) (-0.02) (0.22) (0.14) (1.63) (3.23)
CAPM Alpha -0.28 -0.00 0.14 0.10 1.24∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗
(-0.69) (-0.00) (0.51) (0.29) (2.53) (3.25)
FF-3 Alpha -0.65∗ -0.32 -0.26 -0.30 0.75∗ 1.40∗∗∗
(-1.80) (-1.38) (-1.25) (-1.06) (1.77) (3.00)
Car-4 Alpha -0.59∗ -0.27 -0.21 -0.24 0.81∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗
(-1.67) (-1.19) (-1.09) (-0.57) (1.99) (2.98)
PS-5 Alpha -0.69∗ -0.44∗∗ -0.28 -0.37 0.74∗ 1.43∗∗∗
(-1.83) (-2.07) (-1.54) (-1.53) (1.72) (2.99)
Panel B: Value-Weighted Returns
Panel B: Value-Weighted Returns
1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) High−Low
Excess Return -0.13 0.16 0.28 0.28 1.35∗ 1.48∗∗∗
(-0.17) (0.25) (0.47) (0.46) (1.81) (3.22)
CAPM Alpha -0.12 0.17 0.29 0.29 1.36∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗
(-0.30) (0.58) (1.08) (0.90) (2.84) (3.24)
FF-3 Alpha -0.48 -0.15 -0.11 -0.10 0.88∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗
(-1.39) (-0.68) (-0.56) (-0.37) (2.14) (2.97)
Car-4 Alpha -0.42 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 0.95∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗
(-1.25) (-0.47) (-0.35) (-0.17) (2.38) (2.97)
PS-5 Alpha -0.52 -0.26 -0.13 -0.17 0.87∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗
(-1.42) (-1.32) (-0.77) (-0.74) (2.09) (2.96)
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Table 1.3: Loadings from the Geographic Portfolio Strategy.
This table reports the average monthly excess return (in %) of a portfolio that longs stocks in top quintile
and shorts stocks in the bottom quintile according to their lagged geographic returns. Besides the raw
excess returns, I also report the CAPM alpha, Fama-French 3-factor alpha, Carhart 4-factor alpha, and
the Pastor-Stambaugh 5-factor alpha. The alphas displayed in the first row of Panal A and B correspond
exactly to the alphas displayed in the “H-L” column in Panel A and B in Table 1.2. I also report loadings
on various risk factors: Mkt−Rf , SMB, HML, UMD momentum factor and LIQ, Pastor and Stambaugh
liquidity factor. Panel C and Panel D report results for the sample excluding 100% U.S. firms. The sample
period is from August 1999 to December 2009. p-values of F-test that tests for the joint significance of the
factor loadings are also reported. Standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with 3 lags. The numbers in
the parentheses are t-statistics. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Equally-Weighted Returns
Panel A: Equally-Weighted Returns
Ex. Ret CAPM FF-3 Car-4 PS-5
Alpha 1.52∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗
(3.23) (3.25) (3.00) (2.99) (2.99)
Mkt−Rf -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14
(-1.45) (-1.30) (-1.18) (-1.15)
SMB 0.06 0.06 0.05
(0.43) (0.41) (0.40)
HML 0.17 0.17 0.16
(1.10) (1.10) (1.07)
UMD 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.06)
LIQ -0.03
(-0.26)
p-value of F-test 0.49 0.54 0.65 0.71
R2 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05
N 126 126 126 126 126
Panel B: Value-Weighted Returns
Panel B: Value-Weighted Returns
Ex. Ret CAPM FF-3 Car-4 PS-5
Alpha 1.48∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗
(3.22) (3.24) (2.97) (2.97) (2.96)
Mkt−Rf -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.15
(-1.44) (-1.33) (-1.30) (-1.27)
SMB 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.52) (0.55) (0.54)
HML 0.16 0.15 0.15
(1.10) (1.06) (1.03)
UMD -0.02 -0.01
(-0.23) (-0.21)
LIQ -0.03
(-0.25)
p-value of F-test 0.30 0.43 0.53 0.61
R2 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
N 126 126 126 126 126
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Table 1.3 (Cont.)
Panel C: Equally-Weighted Returns, Exclude 100% US firms
Panel C: Equally-Weighted Returns; Excluding 100% US firms
Ex. Ret CAPM FF-3 Car-4 PS-5
Alpha 1.30∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗
(2.85) (2.86) (2.70) (2.68) (2.74)
Mkt−Rf -0.13 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10
(-1.19) (-0.94) (-0.95) (-0.87)
SMB -0.03 -0.02 -0.03
(-0.22) (-0.17) (-0.18)
HML 0.12 0.11 0.10
(0.84) (0.82) (0.78)
UMD -0.02 -0.01
(-0.20) (-0.15)
LIQ -0.07
(-0.72)
p-value of F-test 0.24 0.46 0.64 0.73
R2 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
N 126 126 126 126 126
Panel D: Value-Weighted Returns, Exclude 100% US firms
Panel D: Value-Weighted Returns; Excluding 100% US firms
Ex. Ret CAPM FF-3 Car-4 PS-5
Alpha 1.36∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 1.30∗∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗
(3.01) (3.01) (2.89) (2.87) (2.92)
Mkt−Rf -0.07 -0.07 -0.11 -0.10
(-0.72) (-0.66) (-0.95) (-0.86)
SMB 0.04 0.06 0.06
(0.25) (0.35) (0.34)
HML 0.08 0.06 0.06
(0.56) (0.45) (0.41)
UMD -0.06 -0.05
(-0.54) (-0.50)
LIQ -0.07
(-0.63)
p-value of F-test 0.24 0.46 0.64 0.74
R2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
N 126 126 126 126 126
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Table 1.4: Geographic Momentum Strategy Over Different Horizons.
This table reports the average monthly excess return (in %) of an equally-weighted (and value-weighted)
portfolio that longs stocks in top quintile and shorts stocks in the bottom quintile according to their lag
geographic returns. Here, I present results of monthly excess returns of portfolios formed in month zero, for
months one to six after portfolio formation. Beside excess returns of top versus bottom lagged geographic
returns, alphas with respect to the CAPM, the Fama-French 3-factor model, the Carhart 4-factor model,
and the Pastor-Stambaugh 5-factor model are also reported. The alphas displayed for the first month after
portfolio formation in row one of Panel A and B correspond exactly to the alphas displayed in row one of
Panel A and B of Table 1.2. The sample period is from August 1999 to December 2009. Standard errors
are Newey-West adjusted with 3 lags. The numbers in the parentheses are t-statistics. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Equally-Weighted Returns
Panel A: Equally-Weighted Returns
Excess CAPM FF-3 Car-4 PS-5
Return Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha
r0,1 1.52
∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗
(3.23) (3.25) (3.00) (2.99) (2.99)
r1,2 0.23 0.23 0.16 0.14 0.06
(0.49) (0.50) (0.35) (0.29) (0.14)
r2,3 0.15 0.15 0.26 0.21 -0.20
(0.34) (0.33) (0.56) (0.45) (-0.42)
r3,4 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.51
(0.56) (0.56) (0.52) (0.51) (1.01)
r4,5 -0.27 -0.27 -0.14 -0.07 -0.29
(-0.60) (-0.60) (-0.31) (-0.15) (-0.63)
r5,6 0.25 0.25 0.31 0.28 0.39
(0.56) (0.56) (0.74) (0.68) (0.93)
Panel B: Value-Weighted Returns
Panel B: Value-Weighted Returns
Excess CAPM FF-3 Car-4 PS-5
Return Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha
r0,1 1.48
∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 1.36∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗
(3.22) (3.24) (2.97) (2.97) (2.96)
r1,2 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.13 0.05
(0.43) (0.44) (0.32) (0.27) (0.12)
r2,3 0.19 0.19 0.32 0.27 -0.14
(0.42) (0.42) (0.70) (0.59) (-0.30)
r3,4 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.49
(0.58) (0.58) (0.53) (0.53) (0.99)
r4,5 -0.31 -0.31 -0.18 -0.12 -0.32
(-0.71) (-0.71) (-0.41) (-0.26) (-0.71)
r5,6 0.29 0.29 0.36 0.33 0.42
(0.67) (0.66) (0.88) (0.81) (1.01)
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Table 1.5: Subsample Robustness Checks.
This table reports the average monthly excess return (in %) of an equally-weighted portfolio that longs stocks
in top quintile and shorts stocks in the bottom quintile according to their lagged geographic returns. Here, I
present results for various subsample of stocks: Panel A: the base case (same as row one of Panel A in Table
1.2), Panel B: Excluding micro-capitalization illiquid securities, defined as firms with stock prices less than
5, Panel (B) Including Financial Firms, and Panel D: Excluding the period 2008-2009 (financial crisis). I
report the average differences in returns of top versus bottom lagged geographic returns, along with portfolio
alphas with respect to the CAPM, the Fama-French 3-factor model, the Carhart 4-factor model, and the
Pastor-Stambaugh 5-factor model. The sample period is from August 1999 to December 2009. Standard
errors are Newey-West adjusted with 3 lags. The numbers in the parentheses are t-statistics. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Base Case
Excess CAPM FF-3 Car-4 PS-5
Return Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha
1.52∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗
(3.23) (3.25) (3.00) (2.99) (2.99)
Panel B: Excluding Illiquid Stocks, prc < 5
Excess CAPM FF-3 Car-4 PS-5
Return Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha
1.27∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ 1.19∗∗ 1.19∗∗ 1.28∗∗
(2.71) (2.70) (2.38) (2.40) (2.49)
Panel C: Including Financial Firms
Excess CAPM FF-3 Car-4 PS-5
Return Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha
1.55∗∗∗ 1.55∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗
(3.28) (3.28) (2.97) (2.98) (3.04)
Panel D: Excluding 2008-2009 Financial Crisis Period
Excess CAPM FF-3 Car-4 PS-5
Return Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha
1.48∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗ 1.15∗∗
(2.89) (2.95) (2.71) (2.59) (2.26)
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Table 1.6: GDP Growth.
This table reports the average monthly return (in %) of a value-weighted portfolio that is long stocks in top
quintile and short stocks in the bottom quintile according to their previous quarter-on-quarter ((GDPq−1−
GDPq−5)/GDPt−5) geographic GDP growth. Thus, portfolios are rebalances every quarter. Besides the
raw excess returns, I also report the CAPM alpha, Fama-French 3-factor alpha, Carhart 4-factor alpha and
the Pastor-Stambaugh 5-factor alpha. The sample period is from August 1999 to December 2009. Standard
errors are Newey-West adjusted with 3 lags. p-values of F-test are reported to test for the significant of
factor models. The numbers in the parentheses are t-statistics. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively.
Ex. Ret CAPM FF-3 Car-4 PS-5
Alpha 0.65∗ 0.65∗ 0.85∗ 0.89∗∗ 0.91∗∗
(1.70) (1.69) (1.96) (2.05) (1.99)
Mkt−Rf 0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.03
(0.07) (0.53) (-0.31) (-0.27)
SMB -0.28 -0.24 -0.24
(-1.30) (-1.53) (-1.53)
HML -0.08 -0.12 -0.13
(-0.64) (-1.04) (-1.05)
UMD -0.13∗ -0.13
(-1.71) (-1.50)
LIQ -0.02
(-0.17)
p-value of F-test 0.16 0.25 0.39 0.53
R2 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.07
N 126 126 126 126 126
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Table 1.8: Inattention versus Processing Complexity.
This table reports the average Pastor-Stambaugh 5 factor alpha, PS-5, (in %) of an equally-weighted portfolio
that longs stocks in top 20 percentile and shorts stocks in the bottom 20 percentile according to their lag
geographic segments’ returns. Here, I present results for various subsamples obtained from independently
double sort firms into four subgroups, low versus high complexity, measured by the Herfindahl index of
sales composition; and low versus high inattention, proxied by whether or not the stock belongs to the S&P
500 Index, Size, Analyst Coverage, and Institutional Holdings. The sample period is from August 2002 to
December 2009. Standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with 3 lags. The numbers in the parentheses are
t-statistics. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
S&P 500 Index Size
Low High Low High
Herfindahl Index
Low 1.60∗∗ -1.11 2.46∗∗ 0.08∗
(2.36) (-0.92) (2.24) (1.05)
High 1.24 0.97 1.81∗ -0.07
(1.54) (0.95) (1.85) (-0.10)
Analyst Coverage Institutional holdings
Low High Low High
Herfindahl Index
Low 2.85∗∗∗ 1.57 1.85∗ 0.39
(2.84) (1.58) (1.92) (0.42)
High 2.04∗∗ -0.14 1.70∗ 1.39
(2.00) (-0.13) (1.83) (1.47)
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Table 1.9: Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Regression.
This table reports results of monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns on lagged geographic
returns and control variables. For the cross-sectional regression in month t, the dependent variable is the
stock return in month t. GeoRett−1 is the previous month geographic index return. log(BM) is the natural
log of book to market equity and is the same for all returns from July of year y to June of year y+ 1. Book
equity is computed from the previous fiscal year end closest to December of year y − 1; and market equity
is computed in December of year y − 1. Size is log market equity and is computed at the end of June of
year y, and is the same for all returns from July/y to June/y + 1. Rett−1 and Rett−12,t−2 are the previous
month’s stock return and the cumulative returns from t− 12 to t− 2, respectively. PrimaryIndRett−12,t−2
is the industry’s cumulative return from month t− 12 to month t− 2. SUE is the most recent standardized
unexpected earnings before month t. The computation of SUE can be found in more details in the text.
Standard errors are Newey-West adjusted with 3 lags. The numbers in the parentheses are t-statistics. ∗∗∗
, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Monthly return, Rett
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GeoRett−1 0.17∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(2.62) (2.76) (2.62) (2.63) (2.81)
log(BM) 0.36∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗
(2.04) (2.57) (3.09) (2.53)
Size -0.21∗∗ -0.22∗∗ -0.21∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗
(-2.19) (-2.39) (-2.48) (-2.88)
Rett−1 -0.01∗ -0.02∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(-1.75) (-3.10) (-4.45)
Rett−12,t−2 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.34) (1.10) (0.10)
IndRett−1 0.15∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(5.13) (4.73)
IndRett−12,t−2 0.01∗ 0.01
(1.75) (1.25)
SUE 0.01∗∗∗
(20.30)
R2 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06
N 357522 357434 357434 357434 277339
N -month 126 126 126 126 126
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Table 1.10: Fama-Macbeth Regression and Alternative Explanations.
This table reports results of monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions of stock returns on lagged geographic returns
and control variables. For the cross-sectional regression in month t, the dependent variable is the stock return
in month t. GeoRett−1 is the previous month geographic index return. PseudoRett−1 is the pseudo return
computed as in Cohen and Lou (2012), which is the weighted average returns of the conglomerate’s industry
segments (based on SIC-2) constructed using only stand-alone firms in the same industry. ChinaSales/Sales
is the fraction of sales from China, computed as sales in China over total sales. It is zero if the firm has
no sales from China. Similarly, BRICSales/Sales is the sales that comes from Brazil, Russia, India and
China, divided by total sales. GeoSales(i)/Sales is the fraction of sales coming from geographic region i,
over total sales (there are 47 different regions). Other Controls are similar to the variables in Table 7 and
includes: log(BM), natural log of book to market equity and is the same for all returns from July of year y
to June of year y+ 1; Size, log market equity and is computed at the end of June of year y, and is the same
for all returns from July/y to June/y+ 1; Rett−1 and Rett−12,t−2 are the previous month’s stock return and
the cumulative returns from t− 12 to t− 2, respectively; PrimaryIndRett−1 and PrimaryIndRett−12,t−2
are the primary industry previous month’s return and cumulative return from month t− 12 to month t− 2;
SUE is the most recent standardized unexpected earnings before month t. Standard errors are Newey-West
adjusted with 3 lags. The numbers in the parentheses are t-statistics. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Monthly return, Rett
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GeoRett−1 0.22∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.15∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(2.81) (2.85) (1.86) (2.79) (2.79) (2.71)
PseudoRett−1 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(3.23) (3.21) (2.50) (3.21) (3.21) (2.81)
GeoRett 0.03
(0.37)
ChinaSales/Sales 0.98∗
(1.77)
BRICSales/Sales 0.41
(0.72)
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Share of Sales in
No No No No No No Yes
each of the 47 Regions
R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07
N 277339 277339 277339 277339 277339 277339 277339
N -month 126 126 126 126 126 126 126
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Table 1.11: Switching Probability Between Quintile Portfolios.
This table reports the probability of a firm’s moving from quintile i in month t to the quintile j in the next
month t+ 1. The probability of not changing to a different quintile next month is less than 40%.
Month t+ 1
1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) P (qt+1 = qt) P (qt+1 6= qt)
Month t
1 (Low) 0.33 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.33 0.67
2 0.28 0.38 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.38 0.62
3 0.17 0.24 0.31 0.22 0.06 0.31 0.69
4 0.01 0.21 0.22 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.71
5 (High) 0.01 0.12 0.26 0.27 0.34 0.34 0.66
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Table 1.12: Real Effect.
This table reports the effect of having sales in a foreign geographic region on the real quantities of multi-
national firms: sales and operating income. More specifically, I report the predictive regressions of firms’
real quantities and stock returns on past indices returns. The dependent variables are: (1) sales/asset,
sales over total asset, (2) opInc/asset, operating income before depreciation divided by total asset, and (3)
qtrRet, the cumulative stock returns over that previous 3 months. All variables are at quarterly frequency
and the unit of observation is now firm×quarter. The independent variables are resIndexRet, defined as
the fitted residuals from regressing a geographic index return on the U.S. index return. geoSales/sales is
the fraction of geographic sales over total sales, and is zero if a firm does not have sales in a geographic
region in a particular quarter. All variables are winsorized at the 1% level. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level and are Newey-West adjusted with 3 lags. The numbers in the parentheses are t-statistics.
∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
(sales/asset)t (opInc/asset)t qtrRett
resIndexRett−1 0.04 0.20 0.05
(1.15) (0.95) (1.21)
(resIndexRet× geoSales/sales)t−1 0.15∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
(4.51) (2.37) (18.92)
Geographic fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.01 0.00 0.08
N 139370 106746 146468
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CHAPTER 2
THE DYNAMICS OF HEDGE FUND FEES
2.1 Introduction
Compensation contracts play an important role in rewarding and disciplining portfolio managers.
Theoretical models on optimal contracting highlight the dynamic nature of contractual terms based
on the time varying information set available. For example, Heinkel and Stoughton (1994) show that
in a multi-period setting, optimal compensation involves re-contracting based on past performance
of the manager. Such an adjustment of contractual terms is crucial to ensure optimal allocation
of capital among managers with differential ability and to ensure optimal provision of incentive
over time. The welfare implication of portfolio management contracts is apparent given the large
amount of capital invested. At the end of 2009, US registered mutual fund investment companies
managed more than $12 trillion assets for nearly 90 million investors. For the hedge fund industry,
even after the recent crisis, the assets under management were about $1.34 trillion at the end of
2009.
Despite the importance of dynamic contracting, the empirical literature on portfolio management
contracts has mainly focused on static cross-sectional relationships. Only recently have researchers
started to look at dynamics of contracting. Hedge funds are typically perceived to impose a 2/20
fee structure – 2% management fee and 20% incentive fee. As we discover in this paper, contrary
to this conventional wisdom, the management and incentive fees in hedge fund industry exhibit
fair amount of cross-sectional and time-series variation. This provides researchers a rich empirical
setting to test various theoretical predictions on the dynamics of compensation contracts.
Our dataset consists of all hedge funds covered by the Lipper TASS Hedge Fund Database.
The TASS database contains a fee history file that tracks any changes in fund-level management
fee and incentive fee during the period from 2001 to 2004. We expand the fee history file by
adding four snapshots of hedge fund fees for years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. This allows us to
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construct a fairly comprehensive record of fund-level fee changes during the period from 2001 to
2009. For all hedge funds appearing in the database, we identify instances of fee changes if the
recorded management and incentive fees in any given year differ from those recorded in the previous
year. We document a total of 659 instances of fee changes during the sample period, including 297
management fee increases. Out of total of 7,613 hedge funds in our sample, 596 funds – roughly 8%
– changed fees at least once. We also consider the termination of advisory contract (fund closure)
as the extreme case of fee reduction – both the management fee and the incentive fee are reduced
to zero upon fund closure. Based on the snapshots of fee structures over time, we investigate the
following research questions:
• What determines the initial choice of hedge fund fee structure?
• What drives the changes in contracted management fee and incentive fee over time?
• What is the impact of fee changes on the subsequent performance, risk, and flow of money?
Our empirical findings provide important insights on several theoretical predictions on the dy-
namics of compensation contracts. In the cross section of more than 2,500 newly established funds,
we find that those from new families tend to charge at or above-median management fee as well as
incentive fee. This is inconsistent with the signaling theory where new managers signal their pri-
vately known superior ability by having a greater fraction of compensation based on performance.
Neither are these results consistent with the implicit incentive hypothesis which implies that new
funds would have lower explicit incentive fee since their managers already have incentives to work
hard to build their reputation. The lower likelihood of charging below-median fees by new families
is possibly driven by substantial entry and operating costs for the new families. Tendency to herd
could also play a role.
Fees charged by existing families for their newly incepted funds depend positively on the past
performance of the family. Families with superior performance are more likely to charge above-
median management fee and are less likely to charge below-median incentive fee. It appears that
investors feel more confident about a new fund by a family when other funds in the family have
performed well. Similarly, existing families charge higher management fees for a new fund in
a particular hedge fund style following good return to that style. Interestingly, although style
return has a positive effect on fees charged by funds introduced by new families, this effect is not
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statistically significant. Presumably new families do not get credit for generating the superior style
return in the past.
Performance also plays an important role in determining fee changes. Over time, our evidence
suggests that good peer-adjusted performance with a low tracking error leads to an increase in
management fee. This finding is in line with the idea that investors are willing to raise the fixed
compensation on receiving a strong signal of managerial ability. We also find that after poor
performance a fund may decrease management fee or close down. Overall, our evidence suggests
that hedge fund advisory contracts are adjusted to reflect the updated belief about managerial
ability based on past performance. A distinct feature of hedge fund contracts is that fee increases
normally apply only to new investors. This has important implications on the effects of fee changes.
We find that compared to funds with a small increase in management fees, funds with a larger fee
increases experience a bigger drop in subsequent fund flows, and are more likely to maintain their
good performance. Furthermore, compared to a control sample matched by the propensity scores,
funds with a management fee increase have better subsequent
performance, receive lower flows, and take higher risk. These results indicate that fee increases
after good performance may actually benefit existing investors by discouraging new investors and
thus mitigating the negative effect of diseconomies of scale. Finally, we do not find a strong
relationship between performance or fund flows and subsequent incentive fee changes. Further,
increases in incentive fee are followed by a deterioration of performance. This is inconsistent with
the hypothesis that stronger contractual incentives improve managerial performance. Perhaps, in
presence of high-water mark and investment of managerial personal capital in the fund, chang-
ing contractual percentage of incentive fees is not the best way to align managerial incentives.2
Our paper contributes to the literature on the dynamics of compensation contracts in delegated
portfolio management. In the mutual fund industry, Christoffersen (2001) documents that mutual
funds voluntarily waive fees following poor performance. Kuhnen (2005) examines the dynamics of
contractual agreements between mutual funds and investment advisors. Golec and Starks (2004)
examine the impact of mutual fund fee structure changes from asymmetric to symmetric perfor-
mance fee. They find that changes in the fee structure lead to changes in portfolio risk. Warner
and Wu (2010) look at changes in mutual fund advisory contracts. Similar to us, they also find fees
increase after good performance. However, in their case, fees decrease not after poor performance
but after growth from money inflows. By contrast, we find that money inflows increase the proba-
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bility of management fee increase, indicating that in the hedge fund industry, diseconomies of scale
are more likely to be the norm than economies of scale. Furthermore, given the high attrition rate
of hedge funds relative to mutual funds, we explicitly consider fund closures as an alternative to fee
decrease. We find that fund closure is the more likely outcome of poor past performance and money
outflow than is fee decrease. This result highlights the fundamental role of contract termination as
an element of dynamic contracting, as emphasized by Heinkel and Stoughton (1994), in the hedge
fund industry.
In the hedge fund industry, Liang (2001) finds that poor performance results in a reduction in
incentive fee for hedge funds. We also find that changes in contracts are related to prior per-
formance. However, we find that management fees are more sensitive to prior performance than
incentive fees, and that they are adjusted in both directions. Two recent papers are closely related
to ours. Agarwal and Ray (2011) examine also changes in hedge fund fees. They find that changes
in incentive fee are driven by prior performance whereas changes in management fee follow money
flow into the hedge fund. The authors use a different and smaller sample in that paper (April
2008 to June 2011) as well as conduct analysis of fee changes at a daily frequency unlike at annual
frequency in our paper. Ramadorai and Streatfield (2011) examine initial fee structure of newly
incepted hedge funds by existing families. They, like this paper, find that better performing fund
families start funds with higher fees. Besides looking at fees charged by existing families for their
new funds, we look at initial fees charged by new families as well. Further, we examine the hedge
fund fees from a dynamic perspective. In addition to the initial fee structure, we also look at
subsequent changes in hedge fund fees and the implications of those changes. The rest of the paper
is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop hypotheses based on different theoretical
models. Section 3 describes our data. In Section 4 we explore the determinants of initial fees,
and subsequent survival and performance of new hedge funds. Section 5 presents analysis of what
leads to changes in management and incentive fees. A comparative examination of difference in
performance, risk-taking and fund flow around fee changes is conducted in Section 6. The last
section concludes.
2.2 Hypotheses
In this section, we build on intuition of different theoretical models to develop relevant hypotheses
for empirical investigation. This helps us organize our tests and interpret our findings.
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2.2.1 Initial fees
We first investigate how initial fees are determined for a newly introduced fund. We formulate two
sets of hypotheses, one related to new funds introduced by an existing family, the other related
to the fee setting behavior of a new family entering into the hedge fund business. For a fund
management company that has already been operating in the hedge fund industry, investors may
use the performance of its existing funds as a signal about company’s managerial ability. The
success of existing funds gives investors more confidence in the manager’s ability in running the
newly introduced fund. This increases the demand for the new fund and strengthens the bargaining
power of the fund manager, thus allowing her to charge higher initial fees. Conversely, if the existing
funds perform poorly, then it is more difficult for the fund manager to market a new fund with
high initial fees. This intuitive argument leads to the following hypothesis:
• H1: For new funds introduced by an existing family, the initial fees are positively related to
the fund family’s past performance.
To the extent that the initial fees may also be affected by the general market environment, for
example, the popularity of a particular hedge fund investment strategy (style), we also examine
how initial fees are related to the past performance of and fund flow into the hedge fund sector
that a new fund belongs to. We investigate the extend to which fund family performance amplifies
or mitigates the impact of the sector performance on the setting of initial fees. For a company that
is new to the hedge fund world and thus has no track record, existing theories provide conflicting
predictions on its fee-setting behavior. Models that focus on the signaling function of fee structure
suggest that new managers are more likely to charge lower management fees and higher incentive
fees, while models that emphasize learning and implicit incentives predict the opposite.3 According
to the signaling theory, risk averse new managers with privately known superior ability can signal
their skills by accepting more risk in their compensation, i.e., charging low management fees and
high incentive fees. After the ability is revealed, risk aversion induces the managers to switch to
a fee structure with high management fees and low incentive fees. Therefore, we should observe
lower management fees and higher incentive fees in funds introduced by new managers.
According to the implicit incentive theory, new managers without a track record have strong
incentives to perform well even in the absence of explicit incentive fees, because they have to build
up their reputation. Therefore their compensation contracts contain lower explicit incentive fees.
37
Once a manager becomes well-established, such implicit incentives become weaker, and higher
explicit incentive fees are needed in order to induce effort. This feature of optimal contracts has
been highlighted in the learning model of Gompers and Lerner (1999), as well as the dynamic
contracting models of Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Heinkel and Stoughton (1994). Another
natural competing hypothesis is that a new manager charges both higher management fees and
higher incentive fees, because she faces a nontrivial startup cost to enter into a new business, and
lacks enough scale to reduce the operating cost.
We state these three competing hypotheses about the initial fee structure as follows:
• H2A (Signaling hypothesis): New hedge fund families are more likely to charge lower man-
agement fees and higher incentive fees.
• H2B (Implicit incentive hypothesis) New hedge fund families are more likely to charge lower
incentive fees.
• H2C (Startup cost hypothesis): New hedge fund families charge both higher management fee
and higher incentive fees.
2.2.2 Determinants of fee changes
While the initial fee structure reflects some information about managerial ability, more information
is generated over time once a fund starts to operate. When a manager performs well and the belief
about her ability moves upward, the competition among investors for managerial skill then allows
her to negotiate a higher management fee. Conversely, poor performance leads to a fee reduction.
Poor performance may also lead to the termination of the portfolio management contract, as in
the model of Heinkel and Stoughton (1994). In this case a fund is shut down. These intuitive
arguments suggest the following hypothesis:
• H3: Superior performance leads to an increase in management fee, while poor performance
leads to a decrease in management fee or fund closure.
Clearly, fee increase is not the only way for a fund managers with good performance to capitalize
on their perceived high ability. Due to the positive relation between new money flows into a fund
and its past performance, an outperforming manager can simply leave the fees unchanged and get
rewarded by the growth of her fund. Berk and Green (2004) and Dangl, Wu, and Zechner (2008)
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show that managers are indifferent between these two alternative strategies if they can alter the
portfolio risk freely. To the extent that hedge fund managers may have limited freedom in altering
the portfolio risk due to their commitment to certain investment styles, adjusting management fees
would be optimal when changes in the belief about their ability is beyond a certain threshold. The
relation between past performance and the change of incentive fees is less straightforward. In a stan-
dard principal-agent model with risk-neutral investors and a risk-averse manager, if the marginal
productivity and effort costs are the same for high and low ability managers, as in Gibbons and
Murphy (1992) and Gompers and Lerner (1999), the optimal variable compensation is independent
of the managerial skill revealed through performance. Only the fixed compensation is adjusted to
reflect the updated belief. Therefore, one would expect incentive fees to be unresponsive to past
performance. However, if the marginal productivity of effort is higher for more skilled managers,
optimal pay-performance sensitivity may increase with the updated belief about managerial ability.
In this case, we would expect an increase in incentive fees after good performance. Furthermore,
it may also be the case that underperforming funds increase incentive fees in order to induce more
effort, since the underperformance may be due to insufficient pay-performance sensitivity. For ex-
ample, in the CEO compensation literature, Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) document a significant
increase in stock-option compensation for companies in financial distress. We are agnostic about
these competing predictions and rely on the data to determine which scenario is applicable in our
context.
2.2.3 2.3 Implications of fee changes
The model of Berk and Green (2004), while not directly designed for the hedge fund industry,
provides a good starting point for analyzing the implications of management fee changes on fund
performance and fund flows. Within this framework, the management fees charged by the portfolio
manager have an impact on fund flows, but not on expected net returns. When the management fees
are fixed, an outperforming fund tends to attract new money flows, which in turn drive down future
fund performance due to decreasing returns to scale. If outperforming funds increase management
fees, new money inflows will be reduced. Such funds may thus be able to maintain their good
performance on a before-fee basis, but the expected net return will decline due to higher fees.
In the hedge fund world, when a well-performing fund increases its management fee, the newly
increased fee is typically applied to new investors but not the existing clients.6 This particular
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feature of hedge fund fee setting implies a more subtle effect of management fee increase on fund
performance. In this case, fee increase does not reduce the net return to the existing investors. At
the same time, it reduces the performance chasing new money flows, thus mitigating the negative
impact of decreasing returns to scales. As a result, we derive a novel prediction that management
fee increase helps a fund maintain its superior performance.
• H4: Management fee increases lead to lower subsequent fund flow, and higher persistence of
superior performance.
The impact of incentive fee changes on fund flows and performance is more difficult to predict.
To the extent that an adjustment of incentive fee represents an attempt to optimize the pay-for-
performance sensitivity based on an updated information set, it should have a positive impact on
fund performance by better aligning managerial incentives. This positive effect should then induce
more money inflows. However, incentive fee increase may also be a step taken by the fund manager
to extract more surplus from investors, in which case it will have a negative impact on expected
fund return, and thus leading to a decrease in money inflows. Theories on manager’s risk-taking
behavior provide some guidance about the potential impact of fee changes on fund risk. Since the
incentive fees of hedge funds are asymmetric, i.e., managers benefit from the upside potential but
do not bear the downside risk, managers tend to have an incentive to take more risk. An increase
in incentive fees may make this tendency stronger and thus lead to an increase in fund risk. In an
environment with diseconomy of scale, higher management fee is also likely to be associated with
higher fund risk. For example, in the model of Dangl, Wu, and Zechner (2008), for any given level
of managerial ability, fund risk increases linearly with the proportional fee charged by the manager.
This is because higher fees reduce fund size, thus allowing the manager to take more aggressive
positions in illiquid markets without much concern of the negative price impact of trades. In light
of these theories, we state the following as our fifth hypothesis.
• H5: Both management and incentive fee increases (decreases) are followed by an increase
(decrease) in fund risk.
Looking at determinants of initial fees and fee changes as well as consequences of fee changes
will allow us to get a comprehensive view of dynamics of hedge fund advisory contracts. We now
go on to describe the data and define variables used for empirically testing our hypotheses.
40
2.3 Data
Our sample consists of all hedge funds covered by the Lipper TASS Hedge Fund database (TASS)
from 2001 to 2009. The database tracks monthly net asset value (NAV), fund returns, and total
net assets (TNA) for over 7,000 live funds and over 6,000 “graveyard” funds.7 It also provides
comprehensive information on fund inception date, start and end dates for reported performance,
investment objectives, names of portfolio managers and management firms. Moreover, it gives
snapshots of fund characteristics including management and incentive fees, high-water mark, min-
imum investment requirement, lockup periods, redemption notice periods, use of leverage, etc.
Most relevant to our study, the TASS database contains a fee history file that tracks any changes
in fund-level management fee and incentive fee during the period from 2001 to 2004. We expand
the fee history file by adding four snapshots of hedge fund fees in August 2006, October 2007,
December 2008, and December 2009. This allows us to construct a fairly comprehensive record of
fund-level fee changes during the period from 2001 to 2009. For all hedge funds appearing in the
database, we identify instances where the recorded management and incentive fees in any given year
differ from those recorded in the previous year. In our empirical analysis, we restrict to U.S. dollar
denominated funds that report contractual fees. The final sample consists of 7,613 hedge funds.
Admittedly, the fees that hedge funds reported to the TASS database may not capture exactly the
actual fees paid by all fund investors. Depending on their relations with the fund manager, and
the amount of money they commit, some investors may be able to negotiate a fee lower than the
reported one. However, such noise in the data will bias against finding any significant results.
2.3.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for roughly 23,000 fund/year observations in our sample. The
mean management fee and incentive fee are 1.44% and 15.98%, respectively. In contrast to the
common perception that hedge funds have a homogenous fee structure, both management fee and
incentive fee exhibit considerable dispersion. The standard deviation of management fee is 0.61%,
while the standard deviation of incentive fee is 7.27%. Nearly 60% of the fund/years show use of
leverage. About 68% of fund/year observations have high-water mark provision, while 32% involve
personal capital investment by fund managers. The average minimum capital requirement is 1.2
million dollars, and the average lockup period is about 4 months. The average fund age and fund
family age are 72 and 105 months, respectively.
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Table 2 shows the pattern of fee changes over time and by hedge fund investment style. Out of
total 659 fee changes that we identify, vast majority (575) are instances involving change in only one
fee (either management fee or incentive fee). Out of these, instances of management fee increase
dominates with nearly 300 cases. As shown in Panel A, about 30% (98 out of 297 instances) of
management fee increases occurred in 2006. In 2008 and 2009, the number of management fee
increases dropped to 54 and 24, respectively. This could be due to the large deterioration in hedge
fund performance during and immediately after the financial crisis, making it difficult to justify
any increase in management fees. We observe nearly 45% of management fee decreases (63 out
of 139) during 2008-2009. It is possible that, in addition to cutting fees, many poorly performing
hedge funds simply shut down. Panel B provides the breakdown of fee changes by investment style.
We see that fund of funds and long/short equity dominate the fee change events. We take into
account style specific nature of fee changes in our analysis. Table 3 shows the level of fees prior to
changes and the magnitude of changes. A clear pattern emerges that fees prior to an increase are
on average much lower than fees prior to a decrease. In Panels A and B, the average management
fee prior to an increase (decrease) is 1.04% (1.73%) compared to the overall average of 1.44% from
Table 1. Similarly, from Panels C and D, the average incentive fee prior to an increase (decrease)
is 8.7% (18.26%) compared to the overall average of 15.98%. In terms of the magnitude of fee
changes, the average increase (decrease) in management fee is 0.69 (0.65) percentage points, and
the average increase (decrease) in incentive fee is 10.73 (8.78) percentage points. The magnitude
of these changes is economically large given the average level of fees before a change.
2.3.2 Variable Definitions
We measure the performance of hedge funds using the style-adjusted return. We first compute
benchmark returns (or style returns) for each style by taking the asset weighted average of monthly
fund returns based on the 12 primary strategy categories identified in the TASS database. Then
for each fund we calculate the style-adjusted return as the excess return relative to the benchmark
return for its style. We also examine the effect of volatility, measured as the standard deviation of
style-adjusted returns. We compute these measures using monthly data over either a three-year or
one-year period. The monthly fund flow into a particular fund is calculated as
Fund Flowit =
TNAit − TNAi,t−1(1 +Rit)
TNAit−1
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where TNAit and Rit respectively represent the total net assets and the net-of-fee return for
fund i at the end of month t. The new money flow into a particular hedge fund style, or the style
flow, is calculated as the asset-weighted average of monthly fund flows of all existing funds in the
same investment style. We also use alpha based on a 7-factor model, as suggested in Fung and
Hsieh (2001)and Fung and Hsieh (2004), to measure hedge fund performance. We use monthly data
over a three-year period to estimate the alpha. The factors comprise of return on the Standard &
Poor’s 500 index (equity market factor), return on the Russell 2000 index return less the Standard
& Poor’s 500 return (equity size-spread factor), monthly change in the 10-year treasury constant
maturity yield (bond factor), monthly change in the Moody’s Baa yield less the 10-year treasury
constant maturity yield (credit spread factor), and returns on the trend-following risk-factors on
bonds, currencies, and commodities. o’W’Oo’W’O
For the 3-year analysis, the results using 7-factor alpha are qualitatively similar to those obtained
using style-adjusted returns. For brevity, we report in this paper only results based on style-adjusted
performance.
2.4 Determinants of Initial Hedge Fund Fees
In this section, we investigate the determinants of initial hedge fund fees. The sample here consists
of first observed snapshots of 2,622 new hedge funds with age less than two years. We compare
the initial fee of these new funds with fees of other existing funds with the same investment style.
We observe that, although a large mass of new hedge funds charge fees at the median of their
investment style, there is considerable cross-sectional variation. For management fees, 762 (29%)
of funds set their fees at exactly the style median. 631 (24%) funds set their fees below the style
median. Nearly (1,229, or 47%) half of the new funds set their fees above the style median. This
reflects a general trend of increasing management fees over the sample period. Incentive fees exhibit
a lot more concentration (about 71% of funds) at the style median. For the remaining funds, 259
(10%) charge incentive fees below the style median while 496 (19%) funds set their fees above
the style median. We define a rank variable for each fee to capture high, at-median and low fee
relative to the respective style median. We estimate cross-sectional multinomial logistic regressions
separately for management fee and incentive fee to examine which funds start out with high fees.
First we examine the fee setting for new funds started by existing fund families. This allows us to
look at the effect of prior performance of the family on the fees charged. Family performance is
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measured as the value-weighted style-adjusted return of all funds in the family in the year prior to
the new fund’s inception. In the regression, we include hedge fund sector variables such as style
return and style fund flow to examine the effect of general market environment on new funds’ fee
setting. These variables are calculated as the value-weighted return and fund flows, respectively,
of all existing funds with the same investment style in the year prior to the new fund’s inception.
The results are presented in Table 4. Fund families with a good prior style-adjusted performance
tend to charge above-median management and are less likely to charge below-median incentive fees.
This supports our first hypothesis (H1). It suggests investors use the performance of a fund family’s
existing funds to form expectation about the performance of its new funds. Good performance of
existing funds gives investors more confidence about the ability of a fund company, thus allowing it
to charge higher fees. This result is consistent with the finding of Ramadorai and Streatfield (2011).
Not surprisingly, prior style return has a positive effect on fee charged – significant for management
fees, insignificant or marginally significant for incentive fees. High prior return of a particular hedge
fund strategy attracts investors’ attention and generates higher demand for funds following such a
strategy. This allows managers to market such new funds at higher fees. Style flow, which can be
interpreted as a measure of investors’ revealed preference for a particular hedge fund style, has a
positive and significant effect on incentive fees. Higher style flow means subsequently new funds
are less likely to charge below-median incentive fee. The effect of style flow on management fee is
less clear. Following higher style flow, a new fund is more likely to charge at-median management
fee. Interestingly, the interacting term of style return and family performance goes in the opposite
direction of coefficients for both family performance and style return. This suggests that style
performance and family performance partially substitute each other in their effects on fee setting.
However, this effect is not statistically significant.
Next, we investigate the cross-sectional differences between initial fees set by new families and
existing families. Table 5 presents multinomial logistic analysis of fees charged by all new hedge
funds, introduced by either existing fund families or new families. We find that new families
are less likely to charge below-median management fees as well as below-median incentive fees.
This is inconsistent with the signaling hypothesis (H2A). Signaling theory says that new managers
with privately known superior ability will signal their skill by accepting higher performance-based
compensation. Thus the prediction is that new families will charge lower management fees and
higher incentive fees. The results do not line up with implicit incentive hypothesis (H2B) either.
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This hypothesis says that new managers have implicit incentive to work hard to establish their
reputation. Thus they need lower explicit incentives by way of contractual incentive fee. Our
finding that new families charge at or above-median management fee and higher incentive fee
provides some support for the startup cost hypothesis (H2C). New hedge fund families may need
to charge higher fees to recoup substantial costs of floating a new fund and operating it at a
relatively smaller scale. This cost effect may be dominating compared to the considerations about
signaling and implicit incentives. However, we also see some tendency by the new families to cluster
at the median. We also examine effect of style return and style flow on fees charged by new and
existing fund families. The results show that only existing families are more likely to charge higher
fees following good style returns. The coefficient for the interaction of New Family and Style Return
are opposite in sign as the positive effect of Style Return. Taken together, coefficients for Style
Return and for the interaction add up to an insignificant total effect for the new families. This
suggests that new families are unable to justify high initial fees based on good style performance
in the past, presumably because new families play no role in generating such performance. On the
other hand, this result also suggests that poor style performance, such as that observed during the
2008 financial crisis, has less an impact on fees of new family funds.
To summarize, we find that existing families with superior prior performance are more likely
to charge higher fees for their new funds. Also, only existing families get to charge higher fees
following strong performance by the investment style. New families tend to charge at or above-
median fees, providing some support to the possibility of high startup cost of entering into the
hedge fund business.
2.5 Causes of Hedge Fund Fee Changes
In this section, we examine the determinants of hedge fund fee changes and hedge fund closures
using a multinomial logistic regression. We separately present results on instances of management
fee changes and incentive fee changes. The base case outcome is fee unchanged. The alternative
outcomes include fee increase, fee decrease, and fund closure. A fund closure occurs if a fund
drops out of the TASS live fund database due to reasons other than merger or being closed to new
investors before the next snapshot. The explanatory variables include the level of management and
incentive fees (relative to the respective style medians) prior to the fee changes, prior average and
standard deviation of monthly fund performance adjusted for style mean, the interaction between
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the style-adjusted performance and an indicator for standard deviation above style average (high
std. dev.), and prior average monthly fund flow. We measure fund performance, tracking error,
and fund flow over previous three-year and one-year periods. All variables are defined in Section
3.2. We also include a set of fund and fund family characteristics similar to those used in the initial
fee regressions presented in the previous section.
Table 6 presents the results of a multinomial logistic regression that models the probability of
management fee increase, decrease and fund closures. The results are similar for three-year and
one-year regressions. We find that superior past fund performance strongly predicts management
fee increases. One percentage point higher average monthly risk adjusted return during the previous
year improves the odds of an increase in management fee by nearly 40%. Moreover, the magnitude
of negative coefficient for the interaction term offsets most of the positive effect of performance.
This suggests that only funds that deliver better style-adjusted performance with a low volatility are
more likely to increase management fees. This is consistent with the optimal learning of managerial
ability from past performance. If managers deliver better performance with a low volatility, then
investors can be more certain that it reflects true ability, thus making it easier for the fund manager
to increase the fee. On the other hand, if the performance is volatile, then it is too noisy to be a
reliable signal of true ability. Such performance therefore has less impact on the contractual terms.
We find that poor performance predicts a fee decrease as well as fund closure. For the funds
with a lower than average volatility, one percentage point lower average monthly risk-adjusted
return during the previous year increases the odds of fund closure by nearly 40% and increases
the odds of a decrease in management fee by around 30%. Poorly performing funds could choose
closure instead of a decrease in management fee. Again, we find that high standard deviation partly
negates the effect of performance on fund closure. It appears that investors forgive an occasional
poor outcome, attributing it to bad luck. Further, not surprisingly, outflow of money from the
fund is strongly associated with fund closure. Table 6 also finds that initial level of management
fees is significantly related to the subsequent changes. Specifically, funds with high (low) prior
level of management fees 9Proportional change in odds ratio is calculated as exp(0.334)− 1, 0.334
being the coefficient of one-year performance for management fee increase from Table 6. o’W’O
are more likely to decrease (increase) management fee in the subsequent year. Thus some funds
may start out with lower management fee, deliver superior performance and then increase the fee.
Table 7 shows the results of a similar multinomial logistic regression that models the probability
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of incentive fee increase, decrease and fund closures. The results for fund closure here are similar
to those in Table 6. Poor performance with a low volatility predicts fund closure. Again, prior
level of incentive fee is strongly associated with subsequent changes. Funds with higher (lower)
incentive fees are more likely to decrease (increase) them. We find no significant impact of past
performance and fund flows on incentive fee changes. Since funds tend to close down in response
to poor performance rather than decrease fees, we observe fee decreases only for survivors. Funds
that survive after poor performance are likely to have more entrenched managers, and are therefore
less likely to reduce their fees. This may lead to a sample selection bias. What happens when we
account for this bias? We conduct the analysis for fee decreases with Heckman correction which
accounts for the survivorship bias. The first stage probit regression models the fund survival while
the second stage probit regression models the probability of fee decrease. Survival is 0 if the fund
drops out of the TASS live fund database due to reasons other than merger or being closed to
new investors. Otherwise, survival is 1. Based on Tables 6 and 7, control variables such as fund
age and TNA, family TNA, and contractual terms have significant effect only on fund closure and
not on fee decrease. Thus, we include these variables only in the survival regression. Table 8
presents the results for management fee decrease. The results for the relationship between poor
performance and management fee decrease are statistically more significant when compared to the
multinomial logistic results in Table 6. As can be seen from Table 9, even after we account for
the sample selection bias, we do not find any effect of prior performance on a decrease in incentive
fee. However, now lower fund flow predicts a decrease in incentive fee. To examine the effect
of any potential bias due to back-filled returns, we conduct the logistic analysis for fee changes
using performance after excluding fund returns in or before the year when the fund was added to
the TASS database. These results are similar to those discussed above, although in some cases
statistically weaker. We also repeat the analysis with 7-factor alpha as a measure of performance.
The results are qualitatively similar to those presented in Tables 6 to 9. Overall our results about
management fee changes supports the idea that performance acts as a noisy signal for managerial
ability. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, investors respond to a consistently good performance as
a strong signal of superior ability and reward the hedge funds with a higher management fee.
Good but volatile performance may be perceived more as luck and does not result in increased
compensation.
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2.6 Performance, Risk and Fund Flow after Fee Changes
In this section, we investigate the changes in fund performance, risk taking, and fund flow following
the fee alterations. Specifically, we examine the style-adjusted return, fund flow, and the standard
deviation of style-adjusted returns, all measured over one-year period using monthly observations.
There are too few observations for us to examine the three-year period subsequent to the fee changes.
We regress each of these variable on indicator variables Before and After to capture a particular
fee change event. These variables are zero for the group of control funds that do not change fees
throughout the sample period. We interact the After indicator variable with the magnitude of fee
change to capture differential effect following small versus large fee changes. The control variables
include the prior level of fees (relative to respective style medians), fund and family size,
fund and family age, and other fund characteristics lagged by one year. The standard errors are
clustered at the fund level. Panel A of Table 10 reports the regression results around management
fee increase. In Panel B, we present results of F-tests on the null hypothesis that, there is no change
in performance, flows, or volatility following different levels of management fee increase. We find
that, consistent with previous results, performance is significantly better before the fee increase.
Following the fee increase, the style-adjusted return exhibits a significant decline of 17 basis points
per month (over 2 percentage points per annum). Further analysis reveals that the magnitude of
performance drop depends on the level of fee increases. For a small increase of management fee by
25 basis points (roughly the 25th percentile), the risk-adjusted performance declines by 31 basis
points per month. For a moderate increase in management fee by 50 basis points (median change),
the drop in performance is smaller – 23 basis points per month. In both cases, the performance
deterioration is statistically significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, for a large fee increase of 100
basis points (roughly the 75th percentile), the performance drop is only an insignificant 7 basis
point per month – suggesting that these funds continue to outperform the control group following
the large fee increase. Opposite is the case for fund flow. Following the management fee increase,
the overall fund flow declines by about 1.14 percentage point per month (13.7 percentage points per
annum) – statistically significant at the 1% level. We again find that the negative impact on fund
flow critically depends on the level of fee change. For a small fee increase of 25 basis points, we
find no significant decline in subsequent fund low. For a moderate fee increase of 50 basis points,
fund flow declines significantly by 0.87 percentage points per month. Most strikingly, for a large
fee increase of 100 basis points, we observe a huge drop in fund flow of more than 1.6 percentage
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points per month.
The above findings are closely related to theoretical predictions related to the fee performance-
flow relationships in Berk and Green (2004) and Dangl, Wu, and Zechner (2008), and lend support
to our Hypothesis 3. In the previous section, we document that management fee is likely to increase
following a period of persistently good performance. In absence of any fee increase, such a superior
performance will be followed by inflows to the fund. A small increase in management fee does not
significantly discourage these performance-chasing fund inflows. Larger fund size resulting from
higher fund flow combined with decreasing returns to scale, could account for the significant drop
in performance followed by a small increase in management fee. By contrast, large management fee
increases lead to a dramatic drop in fund flow, thus mitigating the negative effect of diseconomies
of scale. Since the increase in management fee normally applies only to new investors, the good
after-fee performance is sustained following a large increase in management fee.
Table 10 also shows that the change of fund risk after management fee increases is insignificant
for the whole sample, but it increases with magnitude of the fee increase. For funds with a large
increase in management fees of at least 100 basis points, there is a marginally significant increase
of 27.4 basis points in monthly volatility. This lends some weak support for our Hypothesis 4.
The slight and insignificant drop in the volatility for the small fee increase group can also be
explained by the model of Dangl, Wu, and Zechner (2008). They show that in the absence of fee
changes, funds tend to take less idiosyncratic risk after good performance, because the subsequent
growth in fund size makes it more difficult to take aggressive positions in illiquid markets. A small
increase in management fee, which tends to occur after good performance, weakens but does not
necessarily reverse this tendency. Since the management fee changes are not random, as we see
from Section 5, the panel regression results above reflect both the endogenous relation between fee
increases and past fund characteristics, and the causal effects of fee increases. To better understand
the impact of management fee increases on returns, flow and risk, we conduct an analysis using
the propensity score matching approach. To implement this approach, we first create for our
management fee increase funds (treatment group) a control group using a logit model. The logit
model use all the explanatory variables in Table 6 (performance, standard deviation, interaction of
the two, and fund flow along with other control variables) to predict the management fee increase
event. The control group is constructed using the nearest neighbor matching method; that is, for
each fund that increased its management fee, we select as its control the fund that has the closest
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predicted probability but does not actually increase its fee. We then examine the differences in the
style-adjusted return, fund flow, and risk between these two groups in the subsequent 12-month
period. Under the assumption that conditional on the observed fund characteristics, management
fee increases occur at random, one can interpret the differences between these two groups as the
causal effects of the management fee increases.
Results based on propensity score matching are presented in Table 11. These results provide
further support for our Hypotheses 3. Funds that increase management fee outperform the control
funds by 23 basis points per month, a marginally significant effect. They also experience lower flows,
by 63 basis points per month, an economically large effect even though statistically insignificant.
Furthermore, both effects get stronger as the magnitude of fee increase gets bigger. For funds
that increased management fee by 0.50% or more, out peformance is 28 basis points per month
and significant at the 5% level. The effect is strongest for most aggressive fee increases of 1% or
more – outperformance of 54 basis points per month and flows lower by 1.12 percentage points per
month. Table 11 also lends direct support to our conjecture about the impact of management fee
increases on fund risk (Hypothesis 4). The volatility of the treatment funds is significantly higher
than that of the control group, and the difference increases monotonically as the fee hike becomes
larger. For the group of funds with 1% or larger fee increase, the difference in monthly volatility
is 1.58 percentage points, with a t-statistics of 3.80. These results suggest higher management
fee are indeed associated with more aggressive risk-taking, as predicted by the model of Dangl,
Wu, and Zechner (2008). Table 12 examines performance, flow and volatility around an increase
in incentive fee. From Panel A, we see that before the incentive fee increase, funds on average
outperform its control group by 21 basis points per month, and receive 61 basis points more fund
flow than the control group. Following the fee increase, we see that the outperformance and higher
fund flow completely disappear, even turning slightly negative. This result, particularly the lack of
new money flow following incentive fee increase, casts doubt on the hypothesis that an increase in
the contractual incentive fee improves performance. If that were the case, we should see the fund
attracting new investors. Holding everything else the same, an increase in incentive fee increases
the sensitivity of manager’s pay to fund performance. However, the incremental effect may be
small, given the presence of high-water mark and other terms in the hedge fund advisory contracts.
Thus, an increase in incentive fee may not necessarily improve incentives sufficiently to offset the
negative impact of higher fees on net performance. The table also shows the volatility of fund
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returns does not change significantly after the increase of incentive fee, a result that is inconsistent
with Hypothesis 4 regarding incentive fee increase. Following a decrease in either type of fee, we do
not find significant changes in performance, fund flow or risk-taking.10 This could be because rather
than decreasing fees, many funds in trouble may choose to close down as indicated by the results
in Tables 6 and 7. To address any potential bias resulting from back-filled returns, we conduct the
analysis of performance before and after the fee changes after excluding fund returns in or before the
year when the fund was added to the TASS database. These results are similar to those discussed
above. To summarize, a key finding in this section is that an increase in management fee, large
enough to reduce future fund flows substantially, mitigates the negative impact of diseconomies
of scale on fund performance. This result suggests that the management fee increases after good
performance is actually beneficial to the existing fund investors, who usually do not have to pay the
increased fee. It discourages fund flow from new investors, thus protecting the existing investors
from the competition for managerial ability.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we examine variation in initial management and incentive fees charged by hedge
funds. We also investigate causes and impacts of contractual changes in these fees. We find that
fund family characteristics and prior performance play an important role in fee determination. In
contrast to the signaling hypothesis and implicit incentive hypothesis, new fund families are less
likely to charge below-median management fees and below-median incentive fees. This is likely due
to higher operating costs of such families. Initial fees of funds introduced by an existing family
are positively related to the prior performance of the family as well as the performance of the
investment strategy they follow. Furthermore, a superior style-adjusted prior performance leads to
an increase in management fee, but only if the volatility of the relative performance is low. After
consistently poor performance, hedge funds tend to close down or decrease fees. These results
point to investors inferring managerial ability from a noisy signal of performance and rewarding
them appropriately. We find that increase in management fees have a significant impact on future
fund flows. In particular, a large increase in management fee leads to a significant decrease in
fund flows. This seems to mitigate the negative effects of diseconomies of scale since funds that
increase their management fee substantially are able to maintain their superior past performance.
A small increase in management fee does not stem off higher fund flows and thus is followed by a
51
deterioration of performance. Furthermore, relative to a control group matched by the propensity
score, funds that increase management fees have significantly higher risk subsequently. Finally,
an increase in incentive fee is followed by a significant decline in fund performance. Overall, our
results provide important insights on determination of fees, and on the intertwined relations among
the fees, fund flow, performance, and risk in the hedge fund industry.
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics hedge fund contract terms over our sample of US dollar denominated
hedge funds over the period of 2001-2009. Mgt. fee and inc. fee give the magnitude of management and
incentive fees respectively. Leverage is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the fund uses leverage. High-
water mark is an indicator variable equal to 1 when there is a high-water mark provision for charging incentive
fee. Minimum investment is the minimum amount an investor has to invest in a hedge fund. Personal capital
is an indicator variable set to 1 when the fund manager invests her own money in the fund. Lockup period
is the period over which investors cannot withdraw their investment. Fund age is time since the inception
of the fund. Family age is time since the inception of the first fund of the hedge fund family.
Percentile Number of
Mean Std. Dev. 1% 50% 99% observations
Mgt. Fee (%) 1.44 0.61 0 1.50 3.50 22473
Inc. Fee (%) 15.98 7.27 0 20.00 25.00 22476
Leverage (0/1) 0.58 0.49 0 1 1.00 22476
High-water Mark (0/1) 0.68 0.47 0 1 1.00 22476
Minimum Investment (USD ’000) 12174 13792 1 500 10000 22421
Personal Capital (0/1) 0.32 0.47 0 0 1 22476
Lockup Period (months) 3.76 7.09 0 0 25 22476
Fund Age (months) 72.37 51.87 6.00 59.00 236.00 22043
Family Age (months) 105.46 64.07 10 96.00 308.00 21914
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Table 2.2: Pattern of Fee Changes
This table shows number of instances of management and incentive fee increase and decrease for a sample
of US dollar denominated hedge funds over the period of 2001-2009.
Panel A: By Year
Year Total Mgt. Fee Inc. Fee Both Mgt. Mgt.
Up Down Up Down Up Down Fee Up Fee Down
Inc. Inc.
Fee Down Fee Up
2002 21 9 3 7 2 0 0 0 0
2003 121 51 26 20 9 3 4 6 2
2004 103 41 19 17 12 5 0 5 4
2006 153 98 17 11 10 8 1 5 3
2007 43 20 11 3 3 3 1 0 2
2008 96 54 21 2 4 4 2 9 0
2009 122 24 42 29 10 4 6 7 0
Total 659 297 139 89 50 27 14 32 11
Panel B: By Investment Style
Style Total Mgt. Fee Inc. Fee Both Mgt. Mgt.
Up Down Up Down Up Down Fee Up Fee Down
Inc. Inc.
Fee Down Fee Up
Convertible Arbitrage 20 9 3 4 1 0 2 1 0
Dedicated Short Bias 6 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 0
Emerging Markets 43 22 3 7 3 0 3 1 4
Equity Mkt Neutral 43 20 8 3 4 0 2 6 0
Event Driven 53 36 7 2 3 1 2 2 0
Fixed Inc Arbitrage 24 13 5 3 1 1 0 0 1
Fund of Funds 198 53 57 33 22 12 3 15 3
Global Macro 35 10 13 4 5 2 0 1 0
Long/Short Equity 159 93 26 21 7 8 1 2 1
Managed Futures 43 18 8 8 3 0 1 3 2
Multi-Strategy 34 19 7 4 1 2 0 1 0
Options Strategy 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 659 297 139 89 50 27 14 32 11
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Table 2.3: Magnitude of Fee Changes
For a sample of US dollar denominated hedge funds that changed fees over the period of 2001-2009, this
table provides magnitude of management and incentive fees prior to change and magnitude of fee change.
Panel A: Management Fee Increase
Mean Median Smallest Largest
Prior Mgt. Fee (%) 1.04 1.00 0.00 3.00
Mgt. Fee Change (%) 0.69 0.50 0.05 3.50
Panel B: Management Fee Decrease
Mean Median Smallest Largest
Prior Mgt. Fee (%) 1.73 1.50 0.40 8.00
Mgt. Fee Change (%) -0.65 -0.50 -0.05 -2.50
Panel C: Incentive Fee Increase
Mean Median Smallest Largest
Prior Inc. Fee (%) 8.70 1.00 0.00 33.00
Inc. Fee Change (%) 10.73 10.00 0.25 33.00
Panel D: Incentive Fee Decrease
Mean Median Smallest Largest
Prior Inc. Fee (%) 18.26 20.00 1.00 30.00
Inc. Fee Change (%) -8.78 -5.00 -0.50 -30.00
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Table 2.4: Determinants of Initial Fees: Existing Fund Families
This table presents the ordered logistic regression results examining the initial fees of new funds introduced
by existing families. The sample consists of first snap shots of fees for funds with age less than 2 years
established by existing fund families. Initial management (incentive) fee is a rank variable classified as
above-, at- or below-median using median management (incentive) fee of existing funds with the same
investment style. Family Performance is the value-weighted style-adjusted return of all funds in the family
in the year prior to the new fund’s inception. Style Return is the value-weighted return of the new fund’s
investment style in the year prior to fund inception. Style Flow is the value- weighted fund flow to the new
fund’s investment style in the in the year prior to fund inception. Leverage is 1 if the fund has leverage and
0 otherwise. High-water Mark is 1 if the fund has a high-water mark and 0 otherwise. Log Lockup is log of
lock-up period in months.
Mamagement Fee Incentive Fee
Family Performance 0.278∗∗ 0.272∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗
(2.43) (2.44) (3.62) (3.57)
Style Return 0.628∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗ 0.338∗∗
(4.63) (4.78) (2.30) (2.31)
Style Return × Family Performance -0.082 -0.080 -0.131 -0.148
(-0.78) (-0.77) (-1.49) (-1.49)
Style Flow -0.004 -0.005 0.010∗∗∗ 0.007∗
(-1.16) (-1.34) (3.11) (1.91)
Style Flow × Family Performance -0.006 -0.007 -0.006∗ -0.006∗∗
(-1.54) (-1.55) (-1.94) (-1.64)
High-water Mark 0.208 1.586***
(0.98) (5.22)
Leverage 0.413∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗
(2.71) (2.86)
Log Lockup 0.057 -0.072
(0.90) (-0.89)
Obvervations 1225 1225 1225 1225
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.049 0.040 0.101
z-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.5: Determinants of Initial Fees: New Families vs. Existing Families
This table presents the ordered logistic regression results examining the initial fees of new funds introduced
by new and existing families. The sample consists of first snap shots of fees for funds with age less than 2
years. Initial management (incentive) fee is a rank variable classified as above-, at- or below-median using
median management (incentive) fee of existing funds with the same investment style. Style Return is the
value-weighted return of the new fund’s investment style in the year prior to fund inception. Style Flow is
the value-weighted fund flow to the new fund’s investment style in the year prior to fund inception. New
Family is an indicator variable that equals one if the newly-incepted fund is the first fund of the family.
Leverage is 1 if the fund has leverage and 0 otherwise. High-water Mark is 1 if the fund has a high-water
mark and 0 otherwise. Log Lockup is log of lock-up period in months.
Mamagement Fee Incentive Fee
New Family 0.608∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗
(3.07) (2.62) (2.96) (2.59)
Style Return 0.593∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗ 0.340∗∗
(4.39) (4.48) (2.10) (2.02)
Style Return × New Family -0.401∗∗ -0.385∗∗ -0.271 -0.277
(-2.22) (-2.17) (-1.33) (-1.36)
Style Flow -0.003 -0.004 0.010∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗
(-0.92) (-1.14) (3.54) (2.40)
Style Flow × New Family -0.004 -0.004 -0.003∗ -0.004
(-0.81) (-0.78) (-0.86) (-0.86)
High-water Mark 0.264∗ 1.539∗∗∗
(1.73) (7.20)
Leverage 0.310∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗
(2.65) (2.82)
Log Lockup 0.079∗ -0.028
(1.85) (-0.56)
Obvervations 2748 2748 2748 2748
Pseudo R2 0.022 0.028 0.021 0.072
z-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.6: Determinants of Management Fee Changes
This table shows the results of a multinomial logistic regression explaining instances of fund closures and
changes in management fee. Performance and Std. Dev. are average and standard deviation respectively of
monthly style-adjusted return over prior three years or one year. High Std. Dev. is an indicator variable set
to 1 if Std. Dev. is above its mean. Fund flow is average monthly rate of new money flow over prior three
years or one year. Prior mgt. fee and prior inc. fee are management and incentive fee from the previous
year adjusted by respective style medians. Leverage is 1 if the fund has leverage and 0 otherwise. Other
variables are defined in the caption of Table 1. The regressions include style and year fixed effects.
Base Outcome: Management Fee Unchanged
3-Year Performance 1-Year Performance
Fund Fee Fee Fund Fee Fee
Closure Decrease Increase Closure Decrease Increase
Performance -0.793∗∗∗ -0.747∗ 0.721∗∗∗ -0.519∗∗∗ -0.327∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗
(-8.14) (-1.78) (4.04) (-8.42) (-1.99) (2.60)
Std. Dev. 0.039∗∗ -0.075 0.060∗ 0.031∗∗ -0.090 0.060∗
(2.48) (-0.89) (1.85) (1.99) (-0.98) (1.48)
Fund Flow -0.021∗∗∗ -0.009 0.023 -0.039∗∗∗ 0.012 0.029
(-2.61) (-0.23) (1.45) (-5.53) (0.53) (2.21)
Performance × High Std. Dev 0.613∗∗∗ 0.569 -0.600∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.280 -0.336∗∗
(5.72) (1.27) (-3.17) (6.74) (1.39) (-2.44)
Prior Mgt. Fee 0.171∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ -1.618∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ -1.561∗∗∗
(3.16) (4.16) (-8.71) (2.35) (3.92) (-8.99)
Prior Inc. Fee -0.001 0.017 -0.010 -0.003 -0.008 -0.014
(-0.08) (0.48) (-0.90) (-0.52) (-0.25) (-1.35)
Log Fund TNA -0.269∗∗∗ 0.101 -0.057 -0.283∗∗∗ 0.040 -0.018
(-9.11) (0.83) (-0.72) (-10.30) (0.36) (-0.25)
Log Fund Age -0.479∗∗∗ -0.245 0.007 -0.362∗∗∗ -0.030 0.062
(-6.60) (-0.66) (0.04) (-7.01) (-0.14) (0.52)
Log Family TNA 0.091∗∗∗ 0.073 0.279∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.066 0.264∗∗∗
(3.87) (0.59) (3.57) (4.33) (0.59) (3.58)
Log Lockup -0.039 -0.008 0.045 -0.042∗ -0.059 0.060
(-1.43) (-0.07) (0.66) (-1.66) (-0.50) (0.97)
Log Minimum Investment 0.100∗∗∗ -0.088 0.119∗ 0.064∗∗ -0.070 0.070
(2.57) (-0.79) (3.36) (2.37) (-0.37) (1.13)
Leverage 0.012 0.015 -0.130 0.065 -0.100 -0.142
(0.18) (0.05) (-0.79) (1.02) (-0.35) (-0.92)
Personal Capital -0.187∗∗∗ 0.455 0.336∗ -0.260∗∗∗ 0.374 0.274∗
(-3.72) (1.97) (1.90) (-4.04) (1.79) (2.14)
High-water Mark -0.175∗∗ 0.076 0.377∗ -0.215∗∗∗ 0.086 0.511∗
(-2.25) (0.20) (1.82) (-2.90) (0.25) (2.50)
Observations 8812 9863
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.107
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.7: Determinants of Incentive Fee Changes
This table shows the results of a multinomial logistic regression explaining instances of fund closures and
changes in incentive fee. Performance and Std. Dev. are average and standard deviation respectively of
monthly style-adjusted return over prior three years or one year. High Std. Dev. is an indicator variable set
to 1 if Std. Dev. is above its mean. Fund flow is average monthly rate of new money flow over prior three
years or one year. Prior mgt. fee and prior inc. fee are management and incentive fee from the previous
year adjusted by respective style medians. Leverage is 1 if the fund has leverage and 0 otherwise. Other
variables are defined in the caption of Table 1. The regressions include style and year fixed effects.
Base outcome: Incentive Fee Unchanged
3-Year Performance 1-Year Performance
Fund Fee Fee Fund Fee Fee
Closure Decrease Increase Closure Decrease Increase
Performance -0.786∗∗∗ 0.607 0.195 -0.516∗∗∗ -0.018 0.094
(-8.07) (1.60) (0.49) (-8.41) (-0.04) (0.32)
Std. Dev. 0.039∗∗ -0.173 -0.213∗∗ 0.032∗∗ -0.152 -0.084
-2.47 (-1.25) (-2.57) -2.06 (-1.17) (-0.99)
Fund Flow -0.020∗∗ -0.076 -0.003 -0.039∗∗∗ -0.011 0
(-2.55) (-1.55) (-0.09) (-5.49) (-0.30) (-0.02)
Performance × High Std. Dev 0.608∗∗∗ -0.626 0.348 0.449∗∗∗ -0.022 0.202
-5.67 (-1.54) (0.84) (6.75) (-0.06) (0.60)
Prior Mgt. Fee 0.173∗∗∗ -0.291 -0.296 0.119∗∗ -0.233 0.149
(3.20) (-1.49) (-1.03) (2.36) (-1.28) (-0.64)
Prior Inc. Fee -0.000 0.155∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗ -0.003 0.158∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗
(-0.04) (6.50) (-5.89) (-0.47) (7.52) (-6.70)
Log Fund TNA -0.269∗∗∗ 0.061 0.338∗ -0.284∗∗∗ 0.054 0.374∗∗
(-9.11) (0.27) (1.77) (-10.33) (0.30) (2.15)
Log Fund Age -0.476∗∗∗ 0.015 -0.315 -0.360∗∗∗ 0.354 -0.136
(-6.57) (0.03) (-0.84) (-6.99) (0.88) (-0.48)
Log Family TNA 0.094∗∗∗ 0.04 -0.167 0.097∗∗∗ 0.103 -0.195
(3.92) (0.21) (-0.88) (4.41) (0.62) (-1.11)
Log Lockup -0.039 -0.115 -0.05 -0.042∗ -0.101 -0.005
(-1.43) (-0.54) (-0.30) (-1.66) (-0.49) (-0.03)
Log Minimum Investment 0.099∗∗∗ -0.042 -0.053 0.063∗∗ -0.194 0.008
(3.54) (-0.24) (-0.66) (2.33) (-1.18) (0.11)
Leverage 0.018 -0.356 0.772∗∗ 0.069 -0.083 0.670∗∗
(0.26) (-0.87) (2.15) (1.10) (-0.20) (1.97)
Personal Capital -0.188∗∗∗ 0.155 -0.243 -0.260∗∗∗ 0.642 -0.286
(-2.69) -0.3 (-0.56) (-3.91) (1.22) (-0.70)
High-water Mark -0.179∗∗ -0.097 1.330∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.068 1.038
(-2.29) (-0.18) (-1.87) (-2.93) (-0.14) (1.57)
Observations 8634 9666
Pseudo R2 0.107 0.115
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 2.8: Performance, Flow, and Volatility around Management Fee Increase
This table examines fund performance, flow and return volatility around an increase in management fee. In
Panel A, the dependent variables are average monthly style-adjusted return, fund flow, and the standard
deviation of monthly style-adjusted returns in each year. Before and After are indicators set to 1 respectively
before and after management fee increase, 0 otherwise. Fee change is the magnitude of management fee
increase. Prior mgt. fee and prior inc. fee are management and incentive fee from the previous year
adjusted by respective style medians. Fund TNA are total net assets of the fund while Family TNA are the
total net assets of the fund family. Leverage is 1 if the fund has leverage and 0 otherwise. Other variables
are defined in the caption of Table 1. The control variables are lagged by one year. Results for F-tests for
difference between Before vs. After, using various level of fee changes are reported in Panel B.
Panel A: Regression Results
Return Flow Volatility
Before (1) 0.242∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 1.337∗∗∗ 1.338∗∗∗ 0.038 0.037
(6.12) (6.12) (6.20) (6.20) (0.46) (0.45)
After (2) 0.070 -0.141 0.195 1.258∗∗ 0.109 -0.311∗
(1.19) (-1.05) (0.85) (2.32) (1.30) (-1.71)
After×Fee Change (3) 0.312∗ -1.580∗∗ 0.622∗∗
(1.73) (-2.21) (2.15)
Prior Mgt. Fee 0.041∗∗ 0.040∗ 0.015 0.021 0.203∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(1.97) (1.91) (0.19) (0.27) (5.52) (5.45)
Prior Inc. Fee -0.001 -0.001 -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗ 0.017*** 0.017∗∗∗
(-0.37) (-0.39) (-2.59) (-2.57) (4.03) (4.00)
Flow 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.006∗∗
(2.07) (2.09) (-2.48) (-2.42)
Return 1.171∗∗∗ 1.173*** 0.086∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗
(24.66) (24.71) (5.17) (5.12)
Return Volatility -0.187∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(-5.45) (-5.43)
Log Fund TNA -0.018∗ -0.018∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗
(-1.82) (-1.82) (-3.38) (-3.38) (-3.94) (-3.96)
Log Family TNA -0.006 -0.006 -0.156∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗∗
(-0.66) (-0.62) (-3.73) (-3.78) (-4.73) (-4.67)
Log Fund Age 0.044∗∗ 0.044∗∗ -0.668∗∗∗ -0.668∗∗∗ -0.044 -0.043
(2.06) (2.07) (-7.49) (-7.50) (-1.30) (-1.27)
Log Family Age -0.026 -0.026 -0.276∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(-1.18) (-1.18) (-2.84) (-2.84) (2.89) (2.88)
Log Minimum Investment 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(3.15) (3.17) (5.58) (5.59) (-2.70) (-2.70)
Log Lockup 0.010 0.010 0.044 0.045 0.031∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(1.09) (1.09) (1.20) (1.22) (2.05) (2.03)
Leverage 0.013 0.012 0.015 0.016 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.61) (0.59) (0.16) (0.18) (3.59) (3.59)
High-water Mark -0.016 -0.016 0.221∗∗ 0.218∗∗ -0.041 -0.040
(-0.61) (-0.59) (2.04) (2.02) (-0.88) (-0.85)
Personal Capital 0.025 0.024 0.220∗∗ 0.221∗∗ 0.008 0.007
(1.10) (1.08) (2.37) (2.38) (0.20) (0.18)
Year and Style Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11223 11223 11353 11353 11223 11223
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Table 2.8 (Cont.)
Panel B: F-test for Difference between After and Before
Return Flow Volatility
Difference P-Value Difference P-Value Difference P-Value
Overall
(2) - (1) -0.172∗∗∗ 0.010 -1.142∗∗∗ 0.001 0.071 0.473
Fee Change=2%
(2)+2×(3)-(1) -0.305∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.475 0.278 -0.193 0.130
Fee Change=5%
(2)+5×(3)-(1) -0.227∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.870∗∗ 0.012 -0.037 0.691
Fee Change=10%
(2)+10×(3)-(1) -0.071 0.414 -1.660∗∗∗ <0.001 0.274∗ 0.082
t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at fund level in parentheses for Panel A. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 2.9: Performance, Flow, and Volatility: Propensity Score Matching
This table examines fund performance, flow and return volatility around an increase in management fee.
Funds that increased management fee (treatment funds) are matched to a sample of control funds using
propensity scores based on determinants of management fee changes in Table 6. Difference, calculated as
performance, flow or volatility of treatment funds minus that of the control funds, is examined at different
levels of fee change. Performance is measured using average monthly style-adjusted return, flow using average
monthly rate of fund flow, and volatility using the standard deviation of monthly style-adjusted returns, all
measured at the annual interval. Fee change is the magnitude of management fee increase.
Return Flow Volatility
Fee Change >= 0
Difference 0.230∗ -0.635 0.499∗∗
Observations 124 124 124
Fee Change >= 0.25%
Difference 0.232∗ -0.552 0.528∗∗
Observations 120 120 120
Fee Change >= 0.50%
Difference 0.283∗∗ -0.773 0.674∗∗
Observations 108 108 108
Fee Change >= 1.00%
Difference 0.541∗∗∗ -1.115 1.584∗∗∗
Observations 34 34 34
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
62
Table 2.10: Performance, Flow, and Volatility around Incentive Fee Increase
This table examines fund performance, flow and return volatility around an increase in incentive fee. In Panel
A, the dependent variables are average monthly style-adjusted return, fund flow, and the standard deviation
of monthly style-adjusted returns in each year. Before and After are indicators set to 1 respectively before
and after management fee increase, 0 otherwise. Fee change is the magnitude of incentive fee increase. Prior
mgt. fee and prior inc. fee are management and incentive fee from the previous year adjusted by respective
style medians. Fund TNA are total net assets of the fund while Family TNA are the total net assets of
the fund family. Leverage is 1 if the fund has leverage and 0 otherwise. Other variables are defined in the
caption of Table 1. The control variables are lagged by one year. Results for F-tests for difference between
Before vs. After, using various level of fee changes are reported in Panel B.
Panel A: Regression Results
Return Flow Volatility
Before (1) 0.209∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.610∗ 0.610∗ 0.065 0.065
(2.20) (2.20) (1.85) (1.85) (0.49) (0.49)
After (2) -0.078 -0.097 -0.193 -0.089 0.091 0.240
(-0.90) (-0.60) (-0.49) (-0.15) (0.58) (0.85)
After×Fee Change (3) 0.002 -0.010 -0.015
(0.16) (-0.28) (-0.90)
Prior Mgt. Fee 0.039∗ 0.039∗ 0.018 0.018 0.195∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(1.80) (1.80) (0.23) (0.23) (5.07) (5.06)
Prior Inc. Fee -0.001 -0.001 -0.020∗∗ -0.020∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(-0.54) (-0.54) (-2.39) (-2.39) (4.03) (4.03)
Flow 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ -0.006** -0.006**
(2.40) (2.40) (-2.40) (-2.40)
Return 1.161∗∗∗ 1.161∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(24.00) (24.00) (4.83) (4.83)
Return Volatility -0.196
∗∗∗
-0.196∗∗∗
(-5.73) (-5.73)
Log Fund TNA -0.015 -0.015 -0.106∗∗ -0.106∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗
(-1.46) (-1.46) (-2.51) (-2.50) (-3.83) (-3.83)
Log Family TNA -0.005 -0.005 -0.180∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗
(-0.46) (-0.46) (-4.27) (-4.27) (-4.43) (-4.44)
Log Fund Age 0.049∗∗ 0.049∗∗ -0.690∗∗∗ -0.690∗∗∗ -0.044 -0.044
(2.26) (2.26) (-7.57) (-7.57) (-1.28) (-1.28)
Log Family Age -0.036 -0.036 -0.235∗∗ -0.235∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(-1.60) (-1.60) (-2.38) (-2.37) (2.90) (2.91)
Log Minimum Investment 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
(3.19) (3.19) (5.58) (5.59) (-2.82) (-2.81)
Log Lockup 0.012 0.012 0.038 0.037 0.033∗∗ 0.033∗∗
(1.29) (1.29) (0.99) (0.99) (2.15) (2.14)
Leverage 0.011 0.011 0.056 0.056 0.131∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.50) (0.59) (0.59) (3.44) (3.44)
High-water Mark -0.023 -0.023 0.230∗∗ 0.230∗∗ -0.040 -0.040
(-0.84) (-0.84) (2.12) (2.12) (-0.84) (-0.84)
Personal Capital 0.030 0.030 0.249∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(1.27) (1.27) (2.58) (2.58) (0.01) (0.03)
Year and Style Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11223 11223 11353 11353 11223 11223
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Table 2.10 (Cont.)
Panel B: F-test for Difference between After and Before
Return Flow Volatility
Difference P-Value Difference P-Value Difference P-Value
Overall
(2) - (1) -0.287∗∗ 0.016 -0.803∗ 0.098 0.026 0.845
Fee Change=2%
(2)+2×(3)-(1) -0.302∗ 0.096 -0.719 0.261 0.145 0.450
Fee Change=5%
(2)+5×(3)-(1) -0.296∗ 0.092 -0.749 0.255 0.100 0.452
Fee Change=10%
(2)+10×(3)-(1) -0.286 0.085 -0.799 0.243 0.025 0.460
t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at fund level in parentheses for Panel A. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON FIRM’S
INVESTMENT
3.1 Introduction
The effectiveness of fiscal policy as a device to manage private sector’s economic activities has
always been at the center of both academic research and public debate. In the standard Keynesian
model, an increase in government spending increases total demand, and as a result, increases
total investment and employment. The “multiplier effect” is a key argument that has been used
to advocate government spending as an effective tool to stimulate private sector’s investment.
Neoclassical economists, however, disagree with this view. They argue that government spending
can “crowd out” consumer spending and private investment, either through the interest rate or
the tax channel. Empirical researches on this topic provide conflicting answers as well. Estimates
of the fiscal multiplier generally range from 0.6 to 2, and is far from being conclusive. The main
challenge in analyzing the effect of government spending on private investment is to identify changes
in government spending that are truly exogenous to the economic environment.
In this chapter, we examine the causal effects of government spending on private sector’s invest-
ment by using a new empirical approach. Our identification is based on two observations. First,
federal funds allocated to local governments are largely dependent on the local population level.
Second, the methods used to estimate the local population level is different during the census years,
when the true population count is obtained, and the non-census years, when an estimation method
is utilized. Hence, the population growth discontinuity in census years caused by the two different
estimation methods is a source of exogenous shock to local population count, and hence is also a
source of exogenous shock to the cross-sectional allocation of federal funds to the regions.
As required by the Constitution, the census has been conducted every 10 years since 1790.
During census years, the population counts can be considered as accurate and correctly reflect
the population statistics. During non-census years, the Census Bureau use an estimation method
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called the “post-censal” population estimate. Post-censal population estimates are computed by
adding population changes obtained from administrative data, such as birth, death and migration,
to the most recent census population count. Since post-censal population estimates use imperfect
administrative data, this counting process introduce book-keeping errors to the population statistics
in non-census years.
For each decennial census year, we define census-shock as the log difference between the post-
censal population estimates and the concurrent census population counts. Census-shock is essen-
tially the measurement error from administrative data accumulated over the non-census years, and
is independent of any economic factors. Our identifying assumption is that the function relating
the population growth and firm investment opportunities does not share exactly the same discon-
tinuity as the function that relates the population growth to population revision due to the census
counts. Put differently, the gap between post-censal population estimate and the true census counts
is purely due to administrative error, and is orthogonal to firm investment opportunities that are
related to regional population growth.
We utilize census-shock as an instrument and exploit the cross-regional variation in federal spend-
ing to examine the effects of public spending on the behavior of local firms. This cross-sectional
identification creates a unique laboratory where we can rule out alternative channels of influences
such as changes in nominal interest rate or any anticipated changes in future tax rate. Nominal
interest rate is the same across all regions. Likewise, since federal spending is financed by federal
taxes, and tax payers living in regions with a positive spending shock should not expect any rel-
ative differences in tax rate compared to other regions. In other words, changes in federal fund
allocation due to census-shock can be considered as virtually free windfall of money from the re-
cipient’s perspective. We investigate the effect of such exogenous changes in federal funds on local
firms investment behavior. This approach differs from most studies that focus on estimating the
aggregate effect of government spending1.
Our results strongly support the substitution, or crowding-out effect of government spending.
We find that in response to an exogenous increase in government spending, local firms significantly
reduce their capital investment and R&D investment. For a 5% increase in census-shock relative
to the mean at the county-level, the representative local firm reduces its capital investment by
roughly 7% and R&D investment by 3%, relative to the mean. This contraction in investment is
1Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2011) also investigated the firm-level responses to the state-level spending shock due
to congressional committee chairmanship changes
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followed by reductions in both employment growth and sales growth. We find that in response to
a federal spending shock, firms increase their dividend payout and repurchases. This pattern is
robust across various model specifications at both the county- and state-level.
We further investigate possible explanations for the causal relationship that government spending
reduces firm investments. First, we find that firms which are more geographically concentrated
reduce their investment more in respond to a positive government spending shock. This suggests
that firms with more geographically concentrated operation have less flexibility to mitigate public
spending shocks, perhaps due to less than perfect mobility of production factors across regions,
such as labor. Second, we find that smaller-sized firms reduce their capital investment more than
larger-sized firms. Small-sized firms are likely to be more resource-constrained and have less flexible
operations, and hence are more affected by government spending shocks. Most importantly, we also
find that firms that are located in regions with higher employment rates decrease their investment
more severely compared to otherwise similar firms in regions with lower employment rates. The
last piece of evidence points towards labor as a potential channel where government spending can
reduce private sectors investment activities.
We provide direct evidence for the labor channel as a mechanism behind our documented
crowding-out effect of government spending. More specifically, we look at the effect of an ex-
ogenous change in government hiring on private sector’s employment growth. Using census-shock
as an instrument for government hiring and federal wage expenditure, we find that an exogenous
increase in government hiring and wage spending decreases private sector’s subsequent employment
growth.
Our empirical findings are consistent with models having microeconomic foundations of labor-
and-leisure trade-off. That is, an increase in fiscal spending allocated to a county results in an
increase in the consumption of leisure of a marginal worker, and thus increase the wage level.
When the regional employment rate is closer to the full employment level, it is even more costly
for firms to hire an additional worker at the margin. Firms with lower capability and flexibility in
dealing with that shock should exhibit a larger crowding-out effect. This channel can be true even
when employment rate is relatively low, since not all types of workers are perfectly substitutable.
Moreover, given that labor forces are not perfectly mobile across regions, an increase in public
hiring decreases the labor pool for the local firms, and therefore crowding-out their employment
growth. This evidence is consistent with the broader explanation that government spending can
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adversely affect private sector’s production factors. Taken all together, the results are consistent
with the crowding out effect of government spending, not through the traditional interest rate or
tax rate channel, but through the labor channel.
There is a substantial literature that analyzes the effects of government spending on the economy.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2007) identify shocks to govern-
ment spending using a structural vector autoregressive models approach that relies on decision and
implementation lags in fiscal policy. Papers that utilize VAR techniques typically find supports
for a positive effect of government spending shocks. In contrast, papers that adopt narrative ap-
proaches and use Ramey and Shapiro (1998) “war dates” and focus on geo-political events that
forecast a large rise in defense spending unrelated to the U.S. economic condition, find a negative
effect of government spending shocks (e.g., Barro (1981), Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg,
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), Ramey (2011))
One common disadvantage of prior approaches is the infrequent shocks as well as potential
correlation with confounding factors affecting overall economics outcomes including increases in
tax rate, or changes in consumer sentiment such as patriotism. This chapter uses cross-regional
(cross-county and cross-state) variation in government spending, which allows us to control for the
overall macroeconomic variables that is common to every regions in U.S., and thus effectively rules
out the confounding channels such as expected changes in tax rate or monetary policy. Similarly to
this approach, Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) use cross-state variation in the state-level military
procurement spending elasticity to aggregate military spending changes to measure the effects on
state output. Clemens and Miran (2012) uses the variation in the stringency of a state’s rules in
the balanced budget requirements to estimate the income multiplier during the periods of fiscal
stress and spending cuts. Shoag (2010) instruments state-level spending with idiosyncratic pension
returns to measure the effect on income and employment.
One closely related paper is Serrato and Wingender (2011a), where they also use county-level
population count revisions to identify exogenous changes in federal spending to examine the effect of
government spending on local income and employment. However, in contrast to their findings that
government spending has a local income multiplier larger than 1, we document that the increase
in local income does not translate to an increase in private sector’s investment.
Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2011) examines firm-level responses to exogenous variation in state-
level federal expenditures using 232 instances of senator or representative of a particular state
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ascends to the chairmanship of a powerful congressional committee. They also finds a crowding-
out effect of an exogenous increase in government spending. One major advantage of our empirical
approach is that by using population count revision as an exogenous shock, we can look at virtually
all states (and hence all firms) over the same and broader time horizon. Our research is distinctive
in that the fiscal spending that we are looking at is not discretionary but formula-based non-
discretionary spendings. It is also noteworthy that our research directly measures the firm-level
responses to the exogenous changes in federal spending allocation using micro-level firm data.
Finally, this chapter contribute evidence on the ramification of imperfect labor mobility. The
literature documents that geographical mobility of workers are limited, and wage-level across differ-
ent localities are not fully arbitraged away (e.g., Topel (1986), Kim (2012)). Our analysis provide
empirical evidence that is consistent with limited mobility of labor forces. Since our study ex-
ploits cross-county variation, the results in our research suggests that labor market can be not fully
integrated at the county-level. From the policy-maker’s point of view, this result is particularly
interesting and important.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Data Sources
We obtain firm-level data from Standard & Poor’s Compustat annual tapes. We use the firm’s
headquarter information in Compustat to merge firm-level financial data with the federal spending
data at the county and state-level. We deflate Compustat financial variables into 1985 dollars using
the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Data on federal spending allocation from 1980 to 2006 at the state and county-level are obtained
from the Consolidated Federal Funds Report (CFFR) published annually by the Census Bureau.
Data from 1983 and onward are available at the Census Bureau’s CFFR website2. The data for 1981
and 1982 can be found from the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds.3 and from the Federal
Outlays dataset. CFFR offers a detailed data on the geographic allocation of federal spending
down to the county level. Federal spending consists of more than a thousand programs. These
programs are categorized into nine broad categories based on purpose and type of recipients. The
2http://www.census.gov/govs/cffr/
3ICPSR 6043 and ICPSR 6064
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categories are: Direct Payments to Individuals, Direct Payments for Retirement and Disability,
Grants, Procurement and Contracts, Salaries and Wages of federal employees and Direct Loans.
We exclude Direct Payments Other than for Individuals which consist mainly of insurance payments
such as crop and natural disaster insurance. Finally, we exclude the Insurance and Guaranteed
Loans category since they represent contingent liabilities and not actual spending. Federal spending
data are converted into 1985 dollars. For each year, we have on average over 3,000 counties in the
sample.
To construct the instrumental variable census-shock at the county level, we use post-censal
population estimates published by the Census Bureau from 1971 to 2007 as well as the decennial
Census numbers4. The post-censal population estimates are based on the components of population
changes including migration, births, and deaths. Data are downloaded from the Census Bureau
and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) archive. Pre-1990
post-censal data are no longer available from the Census Bureau’s website. For the years1971 to
1974, we use the Population Estimates of Counties in the United States from the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research5. For years the 1975 to 1978, we use the data from
the Federal-State Cooperative Program 6. No post-censal population estimates were published
for the years 1979, 1980, 1989, 1990 and 2000. For the years 1981 to 1988, we use population
data from the County Statistics File 4 (CO-STAT 4)7. Data for census years and non-census
years from 1991 onward are taken directly from the Census Bureau’s website8. Local and state
population estimates are produced jointly by the Census Bureau and state agencies. The Federal-
State Cooperative Program has produced the population estimates used for federal funds allocation
and other official uses since 1972.
Data on deaths and births comes from the Vital Statistics and can be found from the NBER
website9 for the years 1970 to 1978. We use the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s
(CDC) Compressed Mortality Files10 for the years 1979 to 1988. We use data tables published in
the Vital Statistics, “Live births by county of occurrence and place of residence” for years 1989
4The distinction between postcensal and intercensal is important. The latter are retrospectively revised to account
for the error of closure in Census years whereas the former are the contemporaneous estimates produced every year
to tract population growth. Intercensal population estimates are not relevant for our study since federal spending
only depends on the contemporaneous estimates.
5Population Estimates study ICPSR 7500
6Population Estimates study ICPSR 7841 and ICPSR 7843
7Population Estimates study ICPSR 9806
8http://www.census.gov/popest/estimates.html
9http://www.nber.org/data/
10http://wonder.cdc.gov/
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and 1990. Data for 1991 to 2007 are taken directly from the Census Bureau’s components of
growth data files available on the Census Bureau’s website. Data on county level deaths are taken
from the NBER’s Compressed Mortality micro data files from 1970 to 1988 and from the CDC’s
Compressed Mortality tabulated files from 1989 to 2006. County level deaths for 2007 to 2009 were
taken directly from the Census Bureau’s components of growth files.
Data on county-to-county migration is obtained from the IRS’s Statistics of Income migration
files. Years 1978 to 1992 were taken from the County-to-County, State-to-State, and County
Income Study Files, 1978-1992 (ICPSR 2937) and Population Migration Between Counties Based
on Individual Income Tax Returns, 1982-1983 (ICPSR 8477). The most recent years are available
directly from the IRS SOI’s website11.
County-level government hiring data is from the Census Bureau website12. The dataset provides
the number of full-time and part-time employees hired by the federal government and also includes
data on the total payroll (or wage spending).
3.2.2 Variable Construction and Data Selection
This section introduce the constructions of the main variables used in this study. Firm’s financial
variables are scaled by the beginning-of-the-year book value of assets. Capxt/At−1 is firm’s capital
investment scaled by book value of assets. R&D/At−1 is firm’s research and development spending
divided by book value of assets. Payout/At−1 is cash dividends and repurchases divided by book
value of assets. Cashflow is defined as income before depreciation and amortization scaled by
the beginning-of-the-year book value of assets. EmployGrowth is the change in the number of
employees scaled by the beginning-of-the-year number of employees. SalesGrowth the change in
the firm’s total sales scaled by the beginning-of-the-year total sales. Tobin’s Q is defined as the
market-to-book ratio of firm total assets, where the numerator equals the market value of equity
plus book assets minus the sum of the book value of common equity and deferred taxes and the
denominator is book value of assets.
We exclude firms that are categorized as Financials, Utility, and Government from the sample.
We also exclude firms that have missing or negative values of book assets. Following the literature13,
we remove firms that experienced recent significant changes such as Mergers & Acquisitions and
11http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/
12http://www.census.gov/govs/apes/
13For example, refer to Almeida, Campello, and Weisbenner (2004) or Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010)
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exclude firm-year observations with more than 100% changes in sales, number of employments
or book assets. We eliminate firm-year observations that have Q larger than 10. To control for
the effects of outliers, financial variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The final
sample spans from 1981 to 2006 and has 115,880 firm-year observations.
We construct variables that measures changes in the federal spending at both the county and state
level. ∆GovSpend is the log changes in government spending. PopGrowthRate is the population
growth rates, defined as the log change in the population.
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics of the main variables used in this study. The mean and
median of Compustat variables are very comparable to the Compustat universe for the sample
period, and this reflects that our sample well represents Compustat firms. The mean annual
growth rate of county-level federal spending is 2.9%. The mean annual population growth rate at
the county-level is 0.3%.
Figure 3.1 shows the annual mean population growth rate at the county-level. The feature that
stands out the most in the figure is the population growth discontinuity in the census years. In
1980 and 2000, the average population growth rate at the county-level is significantly larger than
the moving average, which indicates that on average there is significant under counting of the
population rate over the period prior to those census years. On the other hand, in 1990, the
average population growth rate is significantly smaller than the moving average, which indicates
that on average there is significant over counting of the population growth rate prior to 1990. This
observation motivates our identification strategy, which we introduce in the next section.
3.2.3 Identification Strategy
The identification strategy exploits the sharp discontinuities in the population growth rate in census
years. The first observation that motivates our identification strategy is that federal funds allocated
to the local government is largely a function of the local population level. As a suggestive example,
the The Wall Street Journal article “Census Rejects City Challenge” reports a case of New York
City’s challenge to its 2010 population figures on April 1, 2012 as follows:
“The U.S. Census Bureau has rejected New York City’s challenge to its 2010 popula-
tion figures, maintaining there was no reason to revise its count of just less than 8.2
million people. The city claimed the census fell short by roughly 200,000 people, mostly
because large numbers of housing units were mistakenly classified as vacant. [...] The
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final number matters greatly to the city, as it is used to determine federal
aid distributions. [...] In a letter to the Census Bureau, Mr. Bloomberg said city
demographers believed there were undercounts throughout New York. [...]”
The quoted news article manifests the factual building block of our identification strategy. A large
number of direct federal spending distribution uses annual population estimates to allocate fiscal
spending into each state and county level. The quote emphasizes the significance of the amount
of federal funding determined by the census numbers, since it shows that the local government
greatly cares about their census counts. Official government reports also illustrate the importance
of population level in determining the geographic allocation of federal spending. For example, from
the Government Accountancy Report in 1998:
“Population counts, as derived from the decennial census, are frequently used to ap-
portion federal grants to states and units of local government. Of the $185 billion in
population-based grant funding for fiscal year 1998, formula grants composed 95 per-
cent of the amount and discretionary grants accounted for the rest. Because of formula
grant programs’ reliance on population counts, adjusting these counts based on a PES
could potentially redistribute federal funding among states and localities.”
Further more, Blumerman and Vidal (2009) Governments Division Report Series finds that
approximately $446.4 billion in federal grant and direct assistance money is annually distributed
based in part or in whole on population and income data. Table 3.4 presents a summary by program
of the distribution of federal funds in fiscal year 2007.
The second observation that motivates the identification strategy is that decennial census creates
significant discontinuity in the population growth rate due to the use of two different counting
methods in non-census years and in census years. As required by the Constitution, the census has
been conducted every 10 years since 1790. The Census Bureau place strong emphasis on getting
an accurate count. Census takers follow up by visiting household that fail to return their form
by mail. As a result, the population count during census years can be considered as accurate and
correctly reflect the U.S.’s population statistics.
During non-census years, however, the Census Bureau uses an estimation method called the
“post-censal” population estimate. Post-censal population estimates are computed by adding pop-
ulation changes obtained from administrative data, such as birth, death and migration, to the
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most recent census population count. Since post-censal population estimates use imperfect admin-
istrative data, this counting process introduce book-keeping errors to the population statistics in
non-census years14. Since the census is conducted only every 10 years, the difference between the
census counts and the concurrent population estimates contains measurement error accumulated
over the previous decade.
To illustrate, Figure 3.1 shows the annual average county-level population growth rate from
1970 to 2006. Population growth rate shows a clear abnormal jump in each of the census years.
The discontinuities in the population counts are purely due to the administrative error and is
independent of economics factors. Combine this with the earlier observation that federal spending
is largely a function of the local population level, the discontinuity in the local population count
can be utilized as an exogenous shock to the federal fund allocated to the local regions. In other
words, we expect federal government spending to adjust accordingly to address the error in the
local population count in the non-census years that follow census years. More importantly, this
adjustment in government spending is unrelated to local economics environment.
We define census−shock as the log difference between the most recent population estimates and
concurrent census counts, which captures the administrative book-keeping errors that accumulated
over the non-census years. Figure 3.2 shows that the distribution of the county-level census-shock
for the three census years 1980, 1990 and 2000. The distribution is close to normal and suggests
that the error is not systematically positive or negative and can be considered as random.
We further check the orthogonality of census-shock to other confounding count-specific hidden
characteristics that can influence investment opportunities of firms. Since count-specific social and
economic characteristics are highly persistent and is highly serially correlated, we test whether
county-level census-shock is itself serially correlated.
Figure 3.3 shows the scatter plots of the serial-correlation of the county-level census-shock. The
left and right panel plot serial-correlations of county-level census-shock observations between the
year 1980-1990 and year 1990-2000, respectively. The fitted lines are added to each serial-correlation
plots. In both plots, the slopes are flat and not statistically different from zero, which suggests that
census-shock realization is random and not concentrated in certain areas with some hidden county-
specific characteristics. These plots demonstrate that counties show virtually no serial correlation
in the shocks. This observation confirms that census-shock are measurement error. As the plot
14Government estimate of natural population growth in population is produced using data on births and deaths
while migration is estimated using data on tax returns, Medicare, school enrollment, and automobile registration.
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shows that the shock does not exhibit persistence, we can safely argue that census-shock are not
produced as a by-product of county-specific omitted variables such as illegal immigration that are
known to be highly persistent. Table 3.2 directly tests whether local census-shock predicts local
GDP growth in the future. We find that there is no such predictability.
Having introduced the construction of our identification approach, we next test for the effect of
government spending on private investment.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 First Stage Results
Our first stage regression specification is defined as follows:
∆GovSpendyc+t = α+ βCensus-shockyc
+θGeographic Controlsyc+t−1
+δFEs + 
where yc is the census year, ∆GovSpendyc+t is the log change in government spending t years
after the census year yc. Table 3.3 shows the first-stage results. The first two columns report
the county-level analysis and the last two columns report the state-level analysis. The sample
period is from 1980 to 2006. We exclude the first 3 years after and including each census year.
Control variables include lagged population growth rate, lagged unemployment rate, and average
per-capita state-level total disposable income for the past three years. All models include year-fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county-year level for county-level analysis and at the
state-year level for state- level analysis. The results are economically and statistically significant.
Census-shock at the county-level is a strong predictor for the changes in the county-level allocation
of federal spending in the years that follows the census year.
We repeat the same exercise for each year to see the timeline of correlation between decennial
census-shock and the changes in government spending. Table 3.4 reports the yearly first-stage
regression results. The reference year (yC) is a decennial census year (1980, 1990 and 2000). The
column named yC + i reports the regression results of the years that are i years after the census.
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The results shows a clear time line for the reaction of federal spending adjustment in response to
the population count revision in census years. There is no significant for the first two years after
the census years as census numbers are typically release one year after it was conducted and takes
time to be fully incorporated in the federal spending function. Table 3.4 also shows that 10%
sensus-shock in a county creates 17% exogenous increase in the federal spending allocation over
the decade that follows the census year.
3.3.2 Baseline Results
Our baseline IV regression specification is defined as follows:
Capxi,t/Ai,t−1 = α+ β∆GovSpend IVt−1 +
γFirm Controlsi,t−1 + θGeographic Controlst−1
+δFEs + 
Control variables include Q, Cashflow and Leverage15. As suggested by the results in Table
3.4, we use the years from three to nine following each census. Geographic controls include natural
population growth rate to further control for the potential correlation between the population
growth and regional specific unobserved characteristics that can affect firms’ unobserved investment
opportunities.
Our key coefficient of interest is β. The predicted sign of β is a priori unclear. A positive value
of β coefficient suggests that an exogenous increase in government spending stimulates private
sector’s capital investment. A negative value of β implies that an exogenous increase in government
spending crowding-out private sector’s capital investment.
Table 3.5 presents the main results that match firms location and government spending at the
country level. Columns (1), (3) and (5) present simple OLS regression of firm-level capital invest-
ment spending on previous year’s change in government spending. Columns (2), (4) and (6) regress
firm-level capital investment spending on instrumented change in government spending obtained
from the first stage regression presented in Table 3.3. Columns (1) and (2) include year and county
fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) include year and state fixed effects. Columns (5) and (6) include
15The results are robust across various specifications of control variables. We include leverage since it is highly
significant in the investment equation
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year, county and firm fixed effects.
The results for regular OLS regression is not significant and the sign of β changes with differ-
ent specification. Un-instrumented government spending is endogenous to the conditions of the
local economy. It is possible that government may allocate more federal funds into areas in higher
needs, or regions with low economic prospect. In this case, federal spending allocation can be more
concentrated into firms located in relatively poorer or declining areas with inferior investment
opportunities. On the other hand, it is also possible that regions with higher growth opportu-
nity attract more federal funds, if government thinks the return of investment is higher in that
way. In this case, it is also natural for local firms to increase investment, given good investment
opportunities. Increase in government spending can be either negatively or positively related to
private sector’s spending, both variable caused by deterioration or improvement in local economics
condition.
Consistent with the concern that government spending is endogenous to the local-level firm
outcomes, the simple OLS regression results show that government spending has statistically in-
significant and non-robust effect on local firms’ capital investment.
In contrast, using census-shock to identify exogenous changes in government spending yield
significant and robust results. In columns (2), (4) and (6), the coefficients on ∆GovSpend IV, which
is obtained from the first stage regression in Table 3.3, is statistically and economically significant,
and is robust to alternative specifications. A 5% increase in the local population count due to
census-shock results in an annual average decrease of 4.5% in the local firms’ capital investment.
The coefficients on ∆GovSpend IV is hardly affected by the inclusion of the firm fixed effects.
As a robustness check, we replicate our estimation methodology at the state-level. For the
state-level analysis, the census-shock is defined at state-level and the government spending is also
aggregated at the state-level. Similarly, census-shock at the state-level is the difference between the
population count estimates prior to the census year and the actually population number constructed
in the census year, computed at the state-level. We use census-shock at the state level to identify
exogenous shocks to the federal spending allocate to the state and examine the investment behavior
of the firms located in that state.
It may not be a priori clear how the magnitude of the elasticity of firm investment with respect
to the county-level government spending compares to that of its state-level counterpart. Negative
spillover effect across firms in neighboring counties can lead us to underestimate the magnitude
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of elasticity. That is, given a positive census-shock and the resulting government spending shock
in a county, firms located in the county decrease their investment, and this changes further hit
other firms located in the neighboring counties. On the other hand, if firms in neighboring counties
readily substitutes the decreased investment behavior of firms in a county with positive fiscal
spending shock, our county-level analysis may lead us to overestimate the crowding-out effect.
Table 3.9 presents the main results. We find that the state-level analysis yield very similar effect
on firm investment activities caused by the exogenous changes in government spending.
3.3.3 Government Spending and Other Outcomes
Having established that exogenous increases in government spending cause local firms to reduce
their capital investment, we set out to determine whether public spending affects firms’ other
behaviors that are also consistent with the crowding-outing out effect. More specifically, we look at
firms’ R&D investment, firms’ dividend payout and repurchases policy, firms’ future employment
growth and future sales growth. We run the following regression:
Outcomei,t = α+ β∆GovSpend IVt−1 +
γFirm Controlsi,t−1 + θGeographic Controlst−1
+δFEs + 
where Outcome are the following variables: R&D/A is research and development spending
divided by book assets, Payout/A is cash dividends and repurchases divided by book assets,
EmployGrowth is the change in the number of employees scaled by the beginning-of-the-year
number of employees, and SalesGrowth is the change in the sales scaled by the beginning-of-
the-year sales. Control variables are firm characteristics, Q, Cashflow and Leverage, and other
geographic controls as defined in Table 3.5.
All the coefficients are significant and the signs are consistent with the substitution or crowding-
out effects of government spending. When a county experience a positive census-shock of 5%, the
local firm reduce its R&D investment by 3% on average. Firms increase their payouts in response to
an exogenous increase in government spending. We also find that government spending reduce firms’
future employment growth and sales growth. Complementarity between labor and capital predicts
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that retrenchment in capital expenditures may further decrease firm’s subsequent employment
growth rate. If corporate retrenchment have real effect in terms of firms’ competitiveness in product
market, we expect to observe a negative effect in firms’ product market performance such as sales
growth.
The result that show firms reduce their future employment growth is particularly interesting,
which gives us an indication for the potential channel through which the crowding-out effect can
occur. We explore this in the next section.
3.4 Channels of the Crowding-out Effect
3.4.1 Firm and Geographical Characteristics
Exogenous increase in federal spending allocation, a majority of which are direct transfer to indi-
viduals, is not subject to county-specific increase in tax rate or local government borrowing. In
response to the free windfall of extra income, individuals living in those regions are more likely
to increase their consumption and leisure, and this increase the local wage16 and labor cost as a
results. The resulting decline in the marginal productivity of capital compels companies to scale
back in capital investment as well as R&D investment. Although the local population have more
money in their pocket to spend, they can consume the goods produced in other counties given that
product market in US is sufficiently integrated across the nation. Even if there is income effect,
that prediction goes against our empirical result. For local firms, however, price of the production
factors including labor cost and land prices go up.
In this subsection, we present evidence that suggests immobile production factors such as labor
can be the channel of the crowding-out effect of government spending. To explore this hypothesis,
we first test whether the exogenous change in federal spending have differential effects in regions
with different labor market conditions.
We use the average of the unemployment rate in the past three years to capture the cross-county
differences in the local labor market conditions. By interacting the local unemployment rate with
the instrumented government spending, we investigate how the labor market market conditions (or
labor supply shortage) affect the local firms’ response to the government spending shock. Consistent
16Serrato and Wingender (2011b) provide empirical evidendence that the relative wage level goes up in counties
with positive government spending shock induced by census-shock
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with the conjecture that government spending affects production factor of labor, we find that the
degree of corporate investment retrenchment is smaller for the firms located in region’s with higher
unemployment rate. Column (2) of Table 3.7 shows the result for this test. The coefficient of
the interaction term ∆GovSpend IV × Unemployment is positive and statistically significant,
which means that for regions with lower unemployment rate, the effect of unexpected government
spending on local firms’ investment is stronger.
Next, we test whether the effect of government spending is different for firms that do not have
the capacity to absorb shocks to their production factors. More specifically, we want to see if the
effect of public spending is larger for smaller-sized firms and firms that are more geographically
concentrated. Smaller-sized firms do not have the resources to offset shocks to their production
function. Likewise, firms that are more geographically concentrated do not have the flexibility
to transfer their production to more favorable regions, since many of production factors are not
perfectly mobile.
Consistent with the story that exogenous increases in government spending has a adverse effect
on the local firms’ production factor, such as labor, we find that the effect is stronger for smaller-
sized firms and firms that are more geographically concentrated17. The results can be found in
column (3) and (4) of Table 3.7. The coefficients of the interaction terms ∆GovSpend IV × Size
and ∆GovSpend IV × Dispersion are both statistically and economically significant. The signs
are consistent with our prediction.
3.4.2 Direct Evidence for the Labor Channel
We further investigate the possibility that local labor market is the mechanism through which
the crowding-out effect can occur. We directly test whether an exogenous increase in government
hiring and wage spending to a region adversely affects the local firms hiring decision. To deal
with the potential endogeneity between the government hiring and corporate sector hiring, we
instrument the changes in government hiring with census-shock. However, it is noteworthy that
the endogenous relation between government hiring and private-sector hiring is more likely to be
positively correlated, while the crowding-out effect suggests a negative relation.
Table 3.8 reports the empirical results on the labor channel of the crowding-out effect. To
measure government hiring, we adopt various measures such as the changes in the growth rate of
17We specially thank Diego Garcia and Øyvind Norli for the geographic dispersion data in Garcia and Norli (2012).
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the county-level full-time government employees, the changes in the the growth rate of the county-
level total government hiring, and the change in the growth rate of total payroll received by the total
government employees. The dependent variable is firm-level EmployGrowth, which is the change in
the number of employees scaled by the beginning-of-the-year number of employees. Columns (2),
(4) and (6) show the second stage regression ofEmployGrowth on the three instrumented public
hiring variables: ∆TotalPubHire, ∆CountyPubHire and ∆PubPayroll. ∆TotalPubHire is the
change in total number of government employees scaled by the beginning-of-the-year total number
of government employees. ∆CountyPubHire is the change in the county-level full-time public
employees scaled by the beginning-of-the-year number of employee. ∆PubPayroll is the change in
the payroll received by government employees scaled by the previous year’s payroll. Firm controls
include firm’s Q, Size, and Leverage. All tests include year, county and industry fixed effects.
The second stage regression results show robust negative relationship between government hiring
growth rate and private sector’s hiring growth rate. All measures of changes in government spend-
ing on wage and hiring cause local firms to reduce their future employment growth. Increase in
government hiring decrease labor supply and increase local labor cost in the region and adversely
affect the corporate sector’s hiring decision. The results are consistent with the crowding-out effect
of government spending through the labor channel.
3.5 Conclusion
We examine the causal effect of public sector’s spending on private sector’s investment using a new
empirical approach. Our identification is based on two observations. First, federal funds allocated
to the local governments are largely dependent on the local population level. Second, the methods
used to estimate the local population level is different during non-census years and in census years,
when the true population count is obtained. Hence, the population growth discontinuity in census
years caused by the different estimation methods is a source of exogenous shock to local population
count, and hence is also a source of exogenous shock to the cross-sectional allocation of federal
funds to the regions. We define the discontinuity of the local population growth in census years as
Census-shock.
We show that when a county experiences a positive census-shock of 5%, firms’ capital and R&D
investment is reduced by roughly by 7% and 3%, respectively. This contraction in investment is
followed by reductions in both employment growth and sales growth. We also find that in response
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to a federal spending shock, firms increase their dividend payout and repurchases. This pattern is
robust across various model specifications at both the county- and state-level.
We then investigate possible explanations for the causal effect of government spending on firm’s
investments. We find that firms with geographically concentrated operations and firms that are
smaller in size are more affected by an exogenous increase in federal spending. Geographically
concentrated firms have less flexibility to mitigate spending shocks, perhaps due to less than perfect
mobility of production factors across regions, such as labor. Small-sized firms are also likely to be
more resource-constrained and have less capacity to absorb any spending shocks.
We also find that firms that are located in regions with higher employment rates decrease their
investment more compared to otherwise similar firms in regions with lower employment rates. More
directly, we show that an exogenous increase in government hiring and wage spending reduces
subsequent private sector’s employment growth. This finding is consistent with models having
microeconomic foundations of labor-and-leisure trade-off. Labor forces are not perfectly mobile
across regions. An increase in public hiring decrease the labor pool for the local firms, and therefore
crowding-out their employment growth. Taken all together, the evidence we present are consistent
with the crowding out effect of government spending, not through the traditional interest rate or
tax rate channel, but through the labor channel.
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3.6 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Annual Averages of County-level Population Growth Rate
This Figure plots the average county-level population growth rate from 1971 to 2005. The population growth
rate in non-census years are computed using post-censal population estimates published by the Census
Bureau. Post-censal estimates are computed using the previous census count and population changes from
administrative data: birth, death and migration. The population growth rate in census years 1980, 1990
and 2000 are computed using the current census population count and the post-censal population estimates
in the previous year.
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Census-Shock
This Figure plots the distribution of the county-level census-shock for the census years 1980, 1990 and
2000. Census − shock is the log difference between the post-censal population estimate and concurrent
census population count. Post-censal population estimates are computed using the previous census count
and population changes from administrative data: birth, death and migration. Each county-level census-
shock represents administrative error in population estimates accumulated during non-census years over each
decade.
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Figure 3.3: Serial Correlation of Census-Shock
This Figure shows the scatter plots of the serial-correlation of the county-level census-shock. The left and
right panel plot serial-correlations of county-level census-shock observations between the year 1980-1990 and
year 1990-2000, respectively. The fitted lines are added to each serial-correlation plots. In both plots, the
slopes are flat and not statistically different from zero.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
This Table provides summary statistics of the main variables used in this study. We keep firms with non-
missing and positive book value of assets. Size is log of the book assets. Q is market assets divide by
book assets. Cashflow is the operating income before depreciation divided by book assets. Leverage is
short-term and long-term debt scaled by market value of assets. Capx/At−1 is capital expenditure divide by
book assets. Payout/At−1 is cash dividends and repurchases divided by book assets. R&D/At−1 is research
and development spending divided by book assets. ∆GovSpending is the log difference in the county-level
federal spending. PopGrowthRate is average of county-level population growth rates across all counties.
Mean Median Std. Dev.
Capxt/Assett−1 0.067 0.043 0.075
Q 1.796 1.338 1.324
Cashflow 0.091 0.117 0.188
Size 4.181 4.090 2.101
Market Leverage 0.188 0.136 0.186
Payout/Assett−1 0.024 0.004 0.047
R&D/Assett−1 0.070 0.032 0.096
∆GovSpend 0.029 0.022 0.046
Population growth .003 0 .012
Observations 115880
PubHireGrowth 0.017 0.007 0.057
Full-timePubHire 0.015 0.011 0.052
Pub.PayrollGrowth 0.064 0.052 0.071
Observations 70829
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Table 3.2: Census-Shock and Future GDP Growth
This Table tests whether census-shock can predict future economic conditions at the state-level. Census-
shock is the log difference between the post-censal population estimate and concurrent census population
count. Post-censal population estimates are computed using the previous census count and population
changes from administrative data: birth, death and migration. The sample period is from 1980 to 2006.
The dependent variable is the state-level GDP growth. Column (1) includes all observations from 1 to 10
years after the census year, and column (2) includes all observations from 4 to 10 years after the census year.
Control variables include lagged population growth rate, lagged unemployment rate, and average per-capita
state-level total disposable income for the past three years. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year
level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: GDP Growth
t ∈ [yc + 1, yc + 10] t ∈ [yc + 4, yc + 10]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Census-shock 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003
(1.610) (1.322) (1.499) (1.198)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.272 0.328 0.312 0.397
N 996 995 596 596
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Table 3.3: The Impact of Census-Shock on Government Spending
This Table presents the first stage regression of the effect of census-shock on changes in government spending.
∆GovSpend if the log changes in government spending. Census-shock is the log difference between the post-
censal population estimate and concurrent census population count. Post-censal population estimates are
computed using the previous census count and population changes from administrative data: birth, death
and migration. The sample period is from 1980 to 2006. We exclude the first 3 years after and including
each census year. Control variables include lagged population growth rate, lagged unemployment rate, and
average per-capita state-level total disposable income for the past three years. All models include year-fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county-year level for county-level analysis and at the state-year
level for state-level analysis. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: ∆GovSpend
County-level State-level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Census-shock (County) 0.139∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
(13.971) (9.217)
Census-shock (State) 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(2.288) (2.103)
Controls No Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.074 0.081 0.192 0.195
N 39413 39413 647 647
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Table 3.5: Instrumented Government Spending and Corporate Investment
This Table presents results on the effect of county-level government spending on firms’ investment.
∆GovSpend if the change in government spending. ∆GovSpend IV is the predicted change in government
spending obtained from the first stage regression from columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.3. The instrument
is Census-shock, which is the log difference between the post-censal population estimates and concurrent
census population counts. Post-censal population estimates are computed using the previous census count
and population changes from administrative data: birth, death and migration. Capxi,t/At,t−1 is investment
scaled by book assets. Columns (1), (3) and (4) show the OLS regression of Capxi,t/At,t−1 on ∆GovSpend.
Columns (2), (4) and (6) show the second stage regression of Capxi,t/At,t−1 on the instrumented ∆GovSpend
IV. Standard errors are clustered at the county-year level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ∗∗∗
, ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Capxi,t/Ai,t−1
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆GovSpend 0.006 -0.005 0.005
(0.766) (-0.313) (0.695)
∆GovSpend IV -0.991∗∗∗ -0.882∗∗∗ -0.967∗∗
(-2.688) (-5.909) (-2.221)
Q 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(13.483) (18.803) (11.421) (20.093) (11.723) (14.031)
Cashflow 0.096∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(17.341) (39.059) (10.352) (40.253) (18.201) (20.272)
Leverage -0.017∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗
(-3.783) (-7.554) (-3.159) (-5.841) (-21.752) (-23.247)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.186 0.272 0.130 0.197 0.615 0.504
N 47319 47264 47319 47319 47319 45898
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Table 3.7: Heterogenous Characteristics and the Effect of Government Spending
on Firm’s Investment.
This Table presents results of the effect on county-level government spending on firms’ investment and
various interaction terms. ∆GovSpend IV is the predicted change in government spending obtained from
the first stage regression in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.3. The instrument is Census-shock, which is
the log difference between the post-censal population estimates and concurrent census population counts.
Post-censal population estimates are computed using the previous census count and population changes
from administrative data: birth, death and migration. Capxi,t/At,t−1 is investment scaled by book assets.
Unemployment is the average unemployment rate in the previous 3 years. Size is log of book assets.
Dispersion is the degree of firm’s geographic dispersion as in Garcia and Norli (2012). Standard errors
are clustered at the state-year level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Capxi,t/Ai,t−1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆GovSpend IV -0.746∗∗∗ -0.771∗∗∗ -0.732∗∗∗ -0.777∗∗∗
(-2.956) (-3.048) (-2.910) (-3.029)
∆GovSpend IV ×Unemployment 0.062∗∗
(1.994)
Unemployment -0.001
(-1.269)
∆GovSpend IV ×Size 0.023∗∗
(2.409)
Size -0.008∗∗∗
(-4.296)
∆GovSpend IV ×Dispersion 0.099∗∗
(2.096)
Dispersion -0.002
(-1.131)
Q 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(11.868) (11.877) (11.804) (9.461)
Cashflow 0.075∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(18.320) (18.322) (18.510) (11.368)
Leverage -0.098∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗
(-22.191) (-22.220) (-21.834) (-15.206)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.621 0.621 0.622 0.738
N 42646 42646 42646 20984
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Table 3.8: Instrumented Government Hiring and Corporate Hiring
This Table presents results on the effect of county-level government hiring on firm’s employment growth. The
dependent variable is firm-level EmployGrowth, which is the change in the number of employees scaled by the
beginning-of-the-year number of employees. ∆TotalPubHire is the change in total number of government
employees scaled by the beginning-of-the-year total number of government employees. ∆CountyPubHire
is the change in the county-level full-time public employees scaled by the beginning-of-the-year number
of employee. ∆PubPayroll is the change in the payroll received by government employees scaled by the
previous year’s payroll. Columns (2), (4) and (6) show the second stage regression of EmployGrowth on the
three instrumented public hiring variables: ∆TotalPubHire, ∆CountyPubHire and ∆PubPayroll. The
instrument, Census-shock, is defined as the log difference between the post-censal population estimates and
concurrent census population counts. Firm controls include Tobin’s Q, firm size, and market leverage.
Standard errors are clustered at the county-year level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗
and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: EmployGrowth
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆TotalPubHire -0.004
(-0.150)
∆TotalPubHire IV -2.218∗
(-1.811)
∆CountyPubHire -0.027
(-0.963)
∆CountyPubHire IV -2.150∗
(-1.831)
∆PubPayroll -0.007
(-0.363)
∆PubPayroll IV -2.085∗
(-1.707)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.055 0.057 0.055 0.057 0.055 0.057
N 34503 34381 34503 34381 34503 34381
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Table 3.9: Instrumented Government Spending and Corporate Investment,
State-Level Analysis.
This Table presents results on the effect of state-level government spending on firms’ investment. ∆GovSpend
if the change in government spending. ∆GovSpend IV is the predicted change in government spending
obtained from the first stage regression from Table 3.3. The instrument is Census-shock, which is the log dif-
ference between the post-censal population estimates and concurrent census population counts. Post-censal
population estimates are computed using the previous census count and population changes from adminis-
trative data: birth, death and migration. Capxi,t/At,t−1 is investment scaled by book assets. Columns (1)
and (3) show the OLS regression of Capxi,t/At,t−1 on ∆GovSpend. Columns (2) and (4) show the second
stage regression of Capxi,t/At,t−1 on the instrumented ∆GovSpend IV. Standard errors are clustered at the
state-year level. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5%
and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Capxi,t/Ai,t−1
OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆GovSpend 0.014 0.001
(1.529) (0.081)
∆GovSpend IV -0.807∗ -0.746∗∗∗
(-1.824) (-2.956)
Q 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(12.599) (18.637) (10.498) (11.798)
Cashflow 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(11.859) (39.383) (16.295) (18.347)
Leverage -0.009∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(-1.954) (-3.653) (-19.802) (-22.225)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes No No
Firm FE No No Yes Yes
R2 0.127 0.128 0.621 0.621
N 42647 42647 42647 42647
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